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This thesis intends to study a cross-border transaction in the Transportation & Logistics industry. 
This industry is being subject to a strong consolidation trend over the last years, as a response to 
the current sector’s challenges and the intense competition level. In this sense and as a major 
study, I propose that United Parcel Service (UPS), one of the biggest package delivery 
companies in the world and based in the United States, acquires the Swiss-based company, 
Panalpina World Transport (Panalpina), a top 5 European Freight Forwarding and Logistics 
company. I suggest a bid price of ₣123.84 ($127.00) per share, reflecting a premium of 18% over 
the day prior to the valuation. This deal, which is planned to be an all cash transaction, is 
expected to create net synergies in the amount of $839Mn, while the expected gain for UPS is 
$346Mn. After the acquisition, it is proposed that Panalpina operates as a subsidiary of the major 
company, UPS. 
 
A tese apresentada pretende estudar uma transação internacional na indústria dos Transportes e 
Logística. Esta mesma indústria tem sido sujeita a uma forte tendência de consolidação nos 
últimos anos, como resposta aos desafios correntes do setor e do alto nível concorrencial 
existente no mesmo. Neste âmbito e como estudo central, proponho que a United Parcel Service 
(UPS), uma das maiores empresas na área de distribuição de embalagens do mundo com sede 
nos EUA, adquira uma empresa Suíça, a Panalpina World Transport (Panalpina), sendo esta uma 
empresa de distribuição e logística presente no top 5 Europeu. Como preço de oferta sugiro 
₣123.84 ($127.00) por ação, representando um prémio de 18% sobre o valor de mercado do dia 
anterior à avaliação. Com este negócio, o qual se planeia que seja realizado completamente em 
dinheiro, espera-se criar um valor líquido de sinergias de $839 milhões, sendo que o ganho para 
UPS é estimado em $346 milhões. Após a transação, é proposto que a Panalpina opere como 
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Cross-border M&A is gaining momentum as the world becomes increasingly integrated and 
globally active. Under this scenario, it was proposed an acquisition between UPS, U.S. based, 
and Panalpina, a Swiss-based company, both players in the Transportation & Logistics industry. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study this cross-border acquisition, describing both the 
strategic and financial details of such transaction.  
The T&L industry is deeply related to the development and growth of the world economy. In the 
last two years, the industry has been changing, presenting a clear consolidation trend, motivated 
by companies seeking larger market shares. And the change is yet not expected to settle with 
crowdsourcing, e-commerce and data aggregators posing great challenges to the industry, 
leading to potential innovative partnerships.  
The two studied companies are both top players in their core sectors: UPS is a leader in CEP 
while Panalpina is one of the top players in the FF&L segment in Europe. With transcontinental 
and cross-borders transportation occurring more and more and the traditional postal services 
decaying, it seems natural for these two companies to join competencies, taking advantage of 
their best skills.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: 2) literature review; 3) industry 
review; 4) companies’ analysis; 5) deal rationale; 6) valuation of the individual and resulting 





2. Literature review 
2.1. Valuation Techniques 
Valuation has become the financial analytical skill that managers want to learn and excel 
(Luehrman, 1997). When valuing a company there are several methods that can be used. In the 
purpose of this dissertation, I will discuss the DCF approach, namely the WACC-method and 
APV, as well as the relative valuation method, specifically market and transaction multiples. 
Other methods that will not be presented here include the ECF, DDM, Dynamic ROE, EVA and 
Option Theory, which comprises real option and Black-Scholes theory. 
2.1.1. Cash-Flow Approach 
The methodologies used in this method include forecasting future cash-flows and discounting 
them to their present value (PV) at a rate that reflects their riskiness (Luehrman, 1997). 
According to academic literature, cash-flows are estimated for a limited period of time known as 
the explicit period, after which they are modelled to grow at a constant rate, leading to a terminal 
value. Hence, the value of the firm can be seen as the sum of two separate parts, as shown in the 
following equation:  
 
The Free Cash-Flow to the Firm (FCFF), which is the cash-flow available for all investors such 
as equity holders, debt holders, and any other non-equity investors, is computed through the 
following formula:  
 
The terminal value is computed by making simplified assumptions about the company’s 
performance after the explicit period. Specifically, it assumes that the last estimated FCFF will 
grow at constant rate, 𝑔, in perpetuity, implying a perpetual expected life of the company. 
 
This simplification of the valuation through the terminal value, may not be so straightforward as 
one considers its relative weight to the total firm value. According to Young, et al. (1999), the 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ˗𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 2.1. 
 






𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)






terminal value accounts for, on average, 90% of the total value assuming a five-year period of 
annual estimates and 79% considering a ten-year period. Hence, it is extremely important to 
carefully determine the growth rate used in the terminal value. 
While the methodology used to compute the FCFF is equal between the WACC and APV, the 
key distinct factors lie on the discount rate and the way they account for the value creation or 
destruction by financial tricks (Luehrman, 1997). 
2.1.1.1. The WACC-method 
The WACC-method emerged as best practice in the 1970s, however it is regarded as obsolete in 
the current days (Luehrman, 1997). The discount rate used, commonly referred as the cost of 
capital, is a weighted average of two specific components: the cost of debt (𝐾𝑑); and the required 
return of equity (𝐾𝑒). That said, the WACC is neither a cost nor a required return but a weighted 
average of both (Fernandez, 2004).  
There are three critical components of the WACC as seen in equation 2.4: the required return of 
equity, the after-tax cost of debt, and the target mix between the market values of Debt and 
Equity.  
 
The first term, the required return of equity is built on the risk-free rate, the market risk premium 
and the company’s specific risk known as the levered beta, 𝛽𝑒 (eq. 2.5.). There are several ways 
to estimate this cost of equity such as the CAPM, the Fama-French three factor model or the 
APT. According to Bruner, et al. (1998), the CAPM is the dominant model, hence, this will be 
the one discussed in detail. It is computed as shown in equation 2.5. and its main components are 
described in table 1. 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  𝐾𝑒 ∗
𝐸
 𝐸 + 𝐷  + 𝐾𝑑 ∗
 1 − 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷  𝐸 + 𝐷   
2.4. 
 




The second term, the after-tax cost of debt, allows the WACC to incorporate the value of the 
interest tax shields that arise from a company’s debt (Luehrman, 1997). To estimate this cost of 
debt for investment grade companies, it is fairly accepted to use the YTM to the company’s long 
term bonds, or its attributed rating and default spread. When the firm is not rated nor has 
outstanding bonds, it should be estimated a synthetic rating, with the purpose to achieve a default 
spread, and consequently, a cost of debt. As a last resource, if the company has recently obtained 
a long-term obligation, one can use the required interest rate. 
The third key component, the target proportion of Debt and Equity to the Enterprise Value on a 
market basis, reflects two distinct characteristics. Firstly, it is important to recall that the WACC 
represents the expected return investors could earn on an alternative investment entailing the 
same risk (Luehrman, 1997). Hence, it seems reasonable that market values of Debt and Equity 
are used to provide an accurate opportunity cost for the investor. Secondly, the cost of capital 
should be based on target weights, as opposed to current, since the company’s current capital 
structure may not reflect the expected level over its life. 
Having explained the concepts behind the WACC, it is also important to explain its weaknesses. 
Although it is a tax-adjusted discount rate, it is only suitable for the simplest and most stable 
capital structures (Luehrman, 1997). In fact, it assumes that a company will have a constant ratio 
Table 1: Components used to compute the cost of equity 
Component Description Considerations 
Risk-Free (𝑟𝑓) Expected return of an 
investment with zero 
default risk 
The choice should include government default-free 
bonds, denominated in the same currency as the cash-
flows (Koller, 2005) 
Levered Beta 
(𝛽𝑒) 
Measure of the 
systematic risk of a 
stock relative to the 
market  
Empirically estimated by running a regression of the 
individual stock return on the market returns 
Market Risk 
Premium 
(𝑟𝑚𝑘𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓) 
Excess return required 
by investors to hold a 
risky asset 
According to Damodaran (2009), the historical premium 
approach remains the standard and seems to be a good 
predictor of future market risk premium. It compares the 
actual returns on stocks to the actual returns earned on a 




of Debt-to-EV over its life (Kaplan & Ruback, 1996). Due to this assumption, this method tends 
to misestimate the value of a company.  
2.1.1.2. The APV Method 
The APV approach separates the firm value into two components: the value of operations as if 
the company is all equity financed, and the value added by a firm’s choice of capital structure, 
that is the value that comes from its financing program.  
 
This method follows from the teachings of world known economists Modigliani and Miller who, 
put simply, proposed that in a perfect capital market a company’s choice about its capital 
structure does not impact the value of a company. Considering transaction costs, taxes, distress 
costs, among others, Stewart Myers developed a model in 1974 that discounts different cash-
flow types with different discount rates. In addition, this method relies on the principle of value 
additivity, meaning that it is possible to divide a project into pieces, evaluate each segment 
independently, and subsequently add them together (Luehrman, 1997).  
In order to value the business as all equity financed, the FCFF should be discounted at the 
unlevered cost of equity, 𝐾𝑢, which would have been the cost of equity if the company had no 
debt. According to academic literature, the unlevered discount rate is computed as follows: 
 
 
Where 𝛽𝑢 corresponds to the unlevered beta of the company, meaning the asset beta, which 
measures the operational assets’ systematic risk. This beta can be computed from the average 
asset beta for comparable companies or through the following formula:  
 
The second term of equation 2.6. allows the analyst to explore the value created from the 
financing effects. This can include interest tax shields, costs of financial distress (CFD), 
𝐴𝑃𝑉 = 𝐸𝑉 𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑+ 𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 2.6. 
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subsidies, hedges, and issue costs. Out of these components, I will only focus on the first two, 
since, for the considered companies, they are the most relevant ones. 
Even though there is some academic discussion regarding which discount rate to use when 
valuing the tax shields, I will use the cost of debt based on Luehrman (1997) discussed premise:   
“tax shields are about as uncertain as principal and interest payments”. Hence, the interest tax 
payments (𝐷 ∗ 𝐾𝑑 ∗ 𝑡) are discounted by the cost of debt, during the explicit period. For the 
terminal value of tax shields, I assume that the company debt will grow at the same rate of the 
company.  
The CFD, defined as firms that have difficulty in making their interest payments, differ from the 
actual bankruptcy costs, and tend to occur in an earlier stage. With this, financial distress (FD) is 
far more common in the real world than most people assume (Damodaran, 2006), implying real 
damage to the company’s operations regarding customers, suppliers, employees, and lenders. In 
fact, revenues may decrease, suppliers may demand higher prices or faster payments, employees 
may leave, and lenders may not finance any longer or demand higher interest rates.  
In order to account for CFD Damodaran (2006) suggests that one should estimate the default 
probability of a company as well as its expected CFD, which should then be applied to the 
unlevered free cash-flow. Bearing in mind the academic discussion, uncertainty and difficulty to 
estimate these parameters, I will use Reuters’ default probability and the empirical evidence from 
Korteweg (2007), who estimated a 7.5% CFD for the transportation industry. To compute the its 
present value, CFD will be discounted by the risk-free rate, following the procedure proposed by 
Hennessy & Whited (2005), which implies risk neutrality. Hence, the formula used will be:  
 
In any method, WACC or APV, valuation is always a function of three fundamental factors: 
cash, timing and risk (Luehrman, 1997). Hence, it is important to recall that the reliability of the 
DCF valuation depends on the accuracy of these cash-flow projections, as well as on the realism 
of the assumptions used in calculating the cost of capital (Kaplan & Ruback, 1996).  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐹𝐷 =   









2.1.2. Relative Valuation 
The multiples approach, either trading or transaction, can assist to triangulate the results of the 
DCF method. In fact, it can help a company to stress-test its cash-flows forecasts, to understand 
disparities between its own performance and that of its competitors, and to access its strategic 
positioning relative to its competitors (Koller, et al., 2005). 
In order to perform a correct valuation based on trading multiples, the following conditions 
should be verified:  
 The industry peer group must compete in the same markets, be subject to the same 
macroeconomic conditions, and both have similar growth rates and ROIC; 
 The multiples must be based on forward looking values, in order to account for the basic 
principles of valuation, since these predict more accurately (Liu, et al., 2002); 
 Use multiples that are not affected by the capital structure (EV-multiples) and are less 
susceptible to manipulation (Koller, et al., 2005). 
Transaction multiples include the consideration of similar companies that were recently acquired. 
This feature usually comprises the value of the company and the premium paid by the acquirer. 
Hence, this method can bear greater challenges than solutions. According to Eccles, et al. (1999), 
there is “no single, correct price” for an acquisition, since it deeply depends on the potential 
synergies and the necessary control premium that are individually computed and reliant on each 
acquirer. That said, transaction multiples should be used with caution. 
2.2. M&A  
M&A transactions can be typically categorized as horizontal (target is a competitor), vertical 
(target has a buyer-seller relationship), or conglomerate (target does not show the previous 
relations and operates in different business segments). The first two categories can be considered 
“focusing acquisitions” while the latter deals with diversification (Bruner, 2004).  
2.2.1. Deal rationale 
There are five major strategic rationales used in an acquisition intended to create value (Bower, 
2001): consolidate to remove excess capacity; roll-up geographically fragmented competitors; 
expand into new products and/or markets; acquire to substitute R&D costs; and exploit 
opportunities in a new emerging industry. Goedhart, et al., (2010) mention one more motivation 
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principle that relies on the improvement of the target company’s performance, typically pursued 
by Private Equity firms.  
2.2.2. Valuing synergies 
According to Damodaran (2005) there are two major types of synergies: operating and financial. 
Operating synergies, which tend to be reflected as higher expected cash-flows, come from 
improvements in the operations of the combined firm and can derive from economies of scale 
(cost savings), higher growth potential (revenues enhancement), increased pricing power 
(revenues enhancement), and combination of different strengths (cost savings and/or revenue 
enhancement). Financial synergies can be associated with higher cash-flows and/or lower cost of 
capital and deals with: better use for excess cash, which translates into higher cash-flows from an 
increased capacity to take on more projects; higher debt capacity, which will impact the cost of 
capital; diversification, leading to uncorrelated cash-flows that can translate to higher debt 
capacity; and tax benefits, where there can be tax deductions and/or different tax rates. 
In order to value synergies, Damodaran (2005) proposes to: 1) evaluate each firm independently 
(𝑉1, 𝑉2 ; 2) estimate the value of the combined firm, with zero synergies (𝑉1 + 𝑉2 ; 3) estimate 
the synergy through changes in cash-flows and/or growth rates (𝑉1+2 . In order to complete this 
last step, it is important to account for the financial costs and timing of implementing such 
synergies, known as the synergy matching principle (Sirower & Sahni, 2006).  
After the estimated synergies, it is also important to share and attribute them between the 
companies (Damodaran, 2005). By separating the synergies, the bidder protects itself by paying 
only the synergies dependent on the target.  
Empirical evidence shows that while companies tend to estimate their realized cost savings 
accurately, they do not predict the revenue enhancement so well Christofferson, et al. (2004). 
Moreover, firms tend to underestimate how long it will take to realize both gains in costs and 
revenues (Eccles, et al., 1999).  
2.2.3. Deal payment 
Transactions can be paid using cash, securities, or a combination of both. Considering no capital 
constrains, the difference relies on the level of risk and reward that the acquirer wants to share 
with the target. In an all-cash transaction, the acquiring shareholders bear all the risks and 
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potential rewards, whereas in a stock transaction, the synergy’s risk is split between both 
companies (Rappaport & Sirower, 1998). The exact amount of shared risk depends whether it is 
a fixed share or a fixed value deal. In the former, despite having a certain number of shares to be 
issued, the value of the deal may fluctuate between the announcement and the closing date, 
conditional on the acquirer’s stock fluctuation. In the latter, the value per share is defined but the 
proportional ownership of the resulting company is left in doubt until its closing. 
When considering whether to pay in cash or stock, a company should analyze whether its own 
shares are under or overvalued, the probability of not realizing the expected synergies, and the 
likelihood of change of the target’s stock price (Rappaport & Sirower, 1998).  
The way a company finances the deal sends a signal to the market regarding the acquirer’s 
confidence on its own acquisition and about its own stock price. In fact, academic studies show 
that cash deals tend to outperform stock deals (Sirower & Sahni, 2006) and that firms tend to pay 
with stock when they believe their shares are overvalued (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003) 
2.2.4. Cross-Border Valuation 
As the world’s economies become increasingly integrated, cross-border acquisitions are expected 
to become even more important in the future. In fact, the volume of such acquisitions has been 
growing, from 23% of total merger volume, in 1998, to 45% in 2007 (Erel, et al., 2012). 
According to Zenner, et al. (2008) there are both long and short-term factors that drive cross-
border M&A. The long-term incentives include globalization (the growing integration of markets 
for labor, capital, goods and services), geography diversification, and deregulation, while the 
short-term drivers comprise, among others, high relative equity valuations, since companies tend 
to be more acquisitive when their stock prices are high, and a strong U.S. dollar, considering a 
transaction where the acquirer is an U.S. firm. On the other hand, the same author also proposes 
factors that can thwart these transactions, such as protectionist policies, tax complexities, cultural 
factors and equity flowback.  
When valuing cross-border investments, there are specific technicalities such as: which currency 
to use in the analysis; whether to discount cash-flows when they occur or at the time they are 
sent to the parent company; whether to use foreign or domestic taxes; and the computation of the 
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cost of capital. Other factors can include foreign exchange risk and political risks like 
expropriation or blocked funds. 
As discussed by Froot & Kester (1995), I will disregard the second mentioned technicality since 
the proposed transaction deals with industrialized nations where there are free flows of capital. 
Also, I will use the domestic currency tax rate. 
The choice then falls below the two distinct methods presented in the following table: 
In this dissertation, I opted to use method B, even though method A will be presented in 
appendix to demonstrate the consistency between both methods. 
2.2.5. Evidence on M&A 
There is no clear consensus among academics whether M&A adds value to the acquiring 
companies. The topic has been widely studied, with academics trying to first categorize 
transactions and then conclude which type of acquisitions adds or destroys value.  
Most academics seem to concur that the selling shareholders are the biggest beneficiaries of 
M&A transactions (Sirower & Sahni, 2006). However, considering the acquiring shareholders 
Table 2: Cross-Border Valuation Methods by Froot & Kester, 1995 
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some mention that these are harm by the transaction (Sirower & Sahni, 2006), while others refer 
that, even if value is not created, it tends to be preserved, meaning that investors tend to cover, at 
least, their cost of capital (Bruner, 2004). At a macroeconomic level, M&A transactions seem to 
create value (Sirower & Sahni, 2006).  Cross-border transactions follow the same pattern as the 
overall M&A activity.  
At last, there is also empirical evidence regarding the type of deal and the size of the target. 
Bruner (2004) found that focus rationales pay more than diversification, while Koller, et al. 
(2010) mention that roll-ups, transformational mergers and “buying cheap” strategies do not 
create value, on average. Regarding the size of the target, some argue that larger deals tend to 
have higher returns than smaller deals (Bruner, 2004), while others claim that companies that do 
smaller deals can succeed and outperform their competitors (Rehm, et al., 2012).  
2.2.6. M&A trends 
The value of global M&A increased in 2015, achieving the highest level ever registered, $4.7 
trillion, while the volume decreased1. This trend was caused, to a certain extent, by a large 
number of mega-deals such as Altice’s acquisition of Cablevision2, AB InBev-SABMiller3, and 
Pfizer-Allergan4.  
Despite global concerns, it seems that U.S. acquirers were encouraged by low interest rates, a 
bull stock market, a strong dollar, improved economy and abundance of excess cash (Tiemann, 
et al., 2015). These reasons contributed for the Healthcare sector to be the most active during 
2015, followed by Technology and Energy & Power. Cross-border M&A appears to have 
increased by 27% compared to previous year, accounting for one third of overall M&A volume5. 
For 2016, several studies indicate a positive trend for M&A activity. In fact, they predict that 
both the number of deals and the average deal size will increase over the current year. It looks 
like M&A continues to be the preferred growth strategy, being supported by the favorable 
macroeconomic indicators (Miller, et al., 2016). Cross-border transactions will continue to rise as 
                                                             
1 According to Thomson Reuters, M&A review 
2 Pending approval from New York state regulators 
3 Pending approval and solving regulatory constrains in certain countries 
4 The transaction was terminated due to “forced” government conditions 
5 Thomson Reuters News 01-01-2015 
12 
 
corporations are expected to seek higher external growth (Garay, et al., 2015). In a nutshell, most 




3. Industry Review 
Considering the proposed transaction, I will analyze the Transportation & Logistics (T&L) 
industry, focusing on three segments: freight forwarding (FF), logistics, and Courier, Express 
and Parcel (CEP).  
3.1. Overall view  
3.1.1. Business Segments 
Freight forwarding in its simplest form is an asset light business model where forwarders buy 
capacity from carriers (airlines, trucking companies, ocean carriers) and offer this capacity to 
their customers as part of organizing their transportation requirements. Some well-established 
firms usually have their own fleet, transforming the business into a heavy asset one. A firm 
operating in this sector also offers services related to tracking and tracing, warehousing, customs 
brokerage and document handling. It comprises air, marine, road and rail freight6. Volumes are 
measured in tons and in TEU (Twenty-foot-equivalent) for the air and sea, respectively.  
The second segment, Logistics, includes complex logistics and logistics-related services along 
the value chain that are performed by a third-party logistics service provider (3PL). Generally, 
services are tailored to a particular industry or customer and are based on long-term contracts (3-
5yr). Services can include warehousing, packaging, labeling, transportation, and quality controls. 
The third segment, CEP, is characterized by high shipping volume with relatively low weights 
per parcel. Courier services, commonly used for short-distances, transport spontaneously sent 
shipments that are highly valuable and require a permanent personal supervision of the shipment.  
Express is associated with time-bound delivery, where the shipment is delivered within a day or 
two. At last, Parcel services concentrate on the transport of individual shipments that, due to 
their standardized size, are easier to handle when compared with the transport of general cargo, 
which has various forms and sizes. 
Naturally, there are some overlaps in the segments, especially between freight forwarding and 
logistics, with a large number of companies offering either segments or at least incorporate one 
or two sub-segments of freight forwarding, including road and rail, in the logistics area. For 
                                                             
6 The air freight division is defined as revenues generated from transportation of freight, mail, express, and 
diplomatic bags by air, while the marine freight sector is related to freight transportation by dry bulk cargo and ship 
container, by sea and ocean going vessels. The road and rail freight segments will not be analyzed in this dissertation 
since the companies involved in the transaction do not operate directly in this area 
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these reasons, when not possible to clearly separate, I will present the freight forwarding and 
logistics as one segment, in order to avoid double counting. 
3.1.2. Market size and evolution 
The T&L market has been increasing over the last 4 years, with a CAGR of 3.9%. Considering 
individual segments, logistics is the largest, representing 28% in 2014, followed by CEP with 
27%. Studies indicate that the overall market will have a CAGR of 5.6% until 2019, with 
logistics leading the upward trend with a 6.8% rate. 
3.1.3. Major players 
Considering the three sub-segments together, there are 3 major players who seem to dominate 
the overall market: DHL, UPS, and FedEx.  Considering each sub-sector we find other players, 
as presented in table 4. In annex 1, you can find some key indicators of the market concentration 
for each segment.  
Being this an industry intense in competition, the major players have been undertaking 
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Figure 1: Market size for the period 2011-14 for the specific 
segments in USD Billions 
Source: Market Line and TI Contract Logistics 
Table 3: Market size for 2014, historical CAGR 2011-14, and estimated 

















3.3. Key drivers, Trends & Challenges 
The major drivers that affect T&L market can be divided into two broad groups: exogenous and 
internal drivers. Under the first group, we find factors such as globalization, GDP growth, major 
input prices (fuel), state intervention (regulation and creation of infrastructures), demographic 
development and demand, while internal factors deal with efficiency (gains created through 
technological progress, economies of scale with denser networks, and process improvements), 
service orientation and innovative technologies. There are seven megatrends and respective 
challenges that are expected to shape the T&L industry in the long-run (Nangia, et al., 2015): 
Table 5: Industry trends and possible actions 
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4. Company Overview 
4.1. United Parcel Service 
UPS was founded in 1907 in Seattle, U.S., and is one of the biggest package delivery companies 
today, having operations in more than 220 countries with 444,000 employees, approximately. 
The company separates its business into three segments: U.S. Domestic Package, International 
Package, and Supply Chain & Freight.  
4.1.1. Business Segments 
The first segment includes time-definite, money-back-guarantee, small package delivery services 
throughout the U.S.. The international segment includes the small package operations in Canada, 
EMEA, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America. These two segments correspond to the CEP sector 
previously explained. The last segment focuses on supply chain management, freight distribution 
through air and sea, customs clearance, trade management and international trade consulting 
service. It matches the FF&L segment earlier explained.  
The following graphs display the revenues and operating profit by segment in 2015, where it can 
be concluded that certain segments are more profitable than others. In fact, the International 
Package has the highest operating margin, 17.6%, where the Supply Chain and Freight presents 
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4.1.2. Strategy  
In order to become less dependent on the parcel segment, UPS has been increasing the scope of 
offered activities over the last 15 years. According to David Abney, appointed CEO in 2014, and 
the latest annual reports, the major strategies deal with:  
 the expansion of global trade by investing in both existing and new networks in 
developed and emerging countries; 
 the growth of e-commerce in the retail sector by creating and developing solutions such 
as UPS SurePost, UPS i-parcel, and UPS My choice7; 
 the creation of numerous industry-specific, integrated solutions, with special focus on 
Healthcare, High-tech and Aerospace segments; 
 the expansion of logistics outsourcing, by moving further into client’s supply chains. 
In order to pursue these strategies, the company has had a strong history of acquisitions, having 
completed 15 over the last 5 years8. To better understand the strategy of the company, please 
refer to annex 4, which presents a SWOT analysis. 
4.1.3. Shareholder Structure 
The company has 99.94% of the outstanding shares in free float, leading to a highly dispersed 
shareholder structure with the top 10 shareholders detaining 28.08% of the overall number of 
shares. The stockholders are mostly institutional (investor managers and brokerage firms), who 
detain 64.8% of the company9. Regarding the geographic distribution, the majority of 
shareholders, 61%, are located in North America, followed by 6.5% in Europe. Further detailed 





                                                             
7 UPS SurePost: service offered where UPS carries the package until the destination city, but then the U.S. Postal 
Services does the final delivery; UPS i-parcel: specific service to e-commerce shipments; UPS My Choice: access 
points for end customers to pick-up their parcels if they wish not to receive it at home 
8 Some of the deals are detailed in annex 8 
9 Nonetheless, 0.1% of the shareholders are strategic, representing the management team 
19 
 
4.1.4. Financial Performance 
Overall, the company presents solid, positive financial results with higher profitability margins 
than the industry, supported by the strong operating performance. Revenue has been increasing 
over the last 6 years with a CAGR of 3.3%. Net Income has fluctuated significantly along the 
years, achieving a minimum of $0.4Bn in 2007, 1.2% of revenues, and a maximum of $4.9Bn in 
2015, representing 8.3% of revenues. The low operating margin in 2007 and 2012 is related to 3 




The relative contributions of each segment to total revenue have been fairly stable over the 
period, even though the growth rate in each segment has varied significantly across time. For 
instance, in 2015, total revenues increased 0.2%, being irregular among the segments: the 
Domestic Package’s revenues increased 2.5%, the International division decreased 6.5%11, and 
the Supply Chain & Freight’s revenues increased 0.8%.  
                                                             
10 In 2007, the events were: adjustments in workers’ compensation claims, withdrawal from a significant high 
margin operation in Asia, and aircraft impairments, while in 2012 it occurred an adjustment to the benefit plans 
mark-to-market charge 
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Operating Profit by Segment
U.S. Domestic Package International Package
Supply Chain and Freight
The relative profitability of each segment also appears to have been stable over the period, 
however the International division seems to have an important weight within the overall 
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Revenue growth by segment
Figure 5: Revenue by segment for the period 2010-15, in 
USD Billions  
Figure 6: Percentage change in revenues by segment for the period 
2011-15 
Figure 5: Operating Profit by segment for the period 2010-15 Table 6: Operating Margin by segment for the period 2013-15 
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In terms of global costs, these have been increasing at a modest rate, with a CAGR 2011-15 of 
3.03%. The major costs are related to labor, approximately 61%, and COGS, 21%. Regarding 
costs as a percentage of revenues, these have been fairly stable, with the exception of COGS. 
 
 
Through table 7, it is clear the improvement of UPS’s performance over the last years and 
compared to the industry, specifically regarding profitability margins. The Debt-to-Equtiy ratio 
has been increasing over the last years, however, Net-Debt-to-EBITDA decreased in the last 
year. The current ratio is lower than the industry, but not significantly, while asset turnover 
seems to be higher and can indicate higher efficiency with the asset resource allocation. In terms 
of average account receivables days the company seems to behave similarly to the industry, 
while for the account payables, UPS presents a higher value, indicating a better working capital 
management than the industry. Most likely, UPS is able to perform in such way due to its big 
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Figure 8: Cost segmentation for the period 2010-15, in USD 
millions 















Ratios 2013 2014 2015 Industry Median
Gross Margin 79.2% 78.8% 82.0% 47.4% 
Operating Margin 12.7% 8.5% 13.1% 7.1% 
Net Margin 7.9% 5.2% 8.3% 3.3% 
Pretax ROA 17.8% 12.9% 19.9% 8.0% 
Reinvestment Rate 36.0% 12.7% 95.2% 8.4% 
Current Ratio 1.88 1.30 1.23 1.59 
Debt/Equity¹ 0.13 0.12 0.16 -
(Total Debt - Cash) / 
EBITDA 0.59 0.95 0.88 0.88 
Avg. A/R Days 41.6 41.4 43.3 42.5 
Avg. A/P Days 75.6 77.5 92.8 51.5 
Asset Turnover 1.48 1.63 1.58 1.55 






Table 7: Key operating and financial ratios 
Source: Reuters, UPS financials 
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4.1.5. Stock Performance 
Over a 6-year period UPS stock had a cumulative return of 58% while the DJTI had 68% and the 
S&P500 62%. In absolute terms, the stock price increased by a 1.82 factor over this same period, 
achieving $104.88 on the day prior to the valuation. Regarding Earnings and Dividends per 
share, the former has varied significantly over the past years whereas the latter has developed an 
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Figure 10: Cumulative monthly Stock Returns of UPS, DJTI, and 
S&P500 Index, for the period 01-Jan-2010 to 23-03-2016 
Figure 11: Basic EPS and DPS  per share of UPS for the period 
2010-15 
Figure 12: UPS’s closing price for the period 01-Jan-2014 to 23-Mar-2016, in USD 
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4.2. Panalpina World Transport 
4.2.1. Business Segments 
Panalpina is one of the leading providers of supply chain management, with operations in all 6 
continents, offices and partnerships in more than 75 and 90 countries respectively, and 
employing 15,000 people. It offers end-to-end supply chain services, specializing in 
intercontinental air and ocean freight, and value-added logistics services. With origins that go 
back to 1935, it is based in Basel, Switzerland, and divides its operations into three main 
segments: Air Freight, Ocean Freight and Logistics12. These segments correspond to the FF&L 
earlier explained.  
The subsequent graphs show that not all segments are equally profitable, since the air freight 
segment has a 3.4% operating margin whilst the Logistics has 0.3%.  
4.2.2. Strategy 
Since the company became listed on the Swiss stock exchange in 2005, it has been developing a 
diverse portfolio of services while creating core competencies to allow growth in the future. 
Peter Ulber, CEO since 2013, shed a light on the two major strategies of Panalpina in the 2015 
AR: explore opportunities to grow organically and improve both productivity and cost 
optimization.  
                                                             
12 The company focuses on ten core industries: automotive, chemicals, consumer and retail, energy, fashion, 














Figure 6: Revenue, Operating profit, and Operating Margin by segment in 2015 
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For the first objective, the company intends to: expand the global network in specific industries 
such as chemicals, healthcare and perishables; offer additional services in the ocean freight 
segment; and increase the expenditure in innovation, under which it proposes to investigate new 
ways of doing business and adding value to customers. In order to discover these innovative 
solutions, the company intends to work with universities, customers and partners. The second 
objective is linked to an initiative named Operations Transformation Program (OTP), which 
started in 2014, and aims to reduce costs across all businesses and geographies13. 
To better understand the strategy of the company, please refer to annex 6, which presents a 
SWOT analysis. 
4.2.3. Shareholder Structure 
The shareholder structure of Panalpina is concentrated, having only has 51.46% of its 
outstanding shares in free float. The top 10 shareholders own 86.29% of the overall shares, with 
one shareholder representing 45.9%. Regarding the type of investor, it is fairly balanced between 
strategic entities, 48.5%, and investment managers, 44.6%, while the investors’ location is 
mostly concentrated in Europe, 64.7%. Further detailed and visual information is displayed in 
annex 7. 
4.2.4. Financial Performance 
Revenues have been fluctuating moderately, with a growth rate characterized by an inverted U-
curve over the last years (2011-15). Net income also presents some uncertainty, achieving 
negative values in 2010 and 2012, -₣0.27 and -0.71Bn respectively, but presenting an upward 
trend afterwards. From 2012 onwards, the evolution of the operating margin reflects an annual 
upward trend. In 2015, revenues dropped 12.7%, achieving ₣5.9Bn, net income increased by 2% 
to ₣0.09Bn, while the operating margin increased by 0.3 percentage points.  
 
                                                             
13 Other strategy that has defined the company over the last years is the wide number of partnerships and 
acquisitions. In 2015, the company made two small acquisitions, Airflo, a freight forwarder for flowers and 




In terms of relative contribution to total revenues, it is clear that the ocean freight segment has 
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Figure 7: Net Income, Revenues and Operating Margin, for the period 2006-15, in CHF billions 
Figure 8: Revenue by segment; Percentage change in revenues 
by segment; and Operating Profit by segment for the period 
2010-15, in CHF  Billions 
Table 8: Operating Margin by segment for the period 2013-15 
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However, more interesting is to analyze the operating profits and the profitability margin 
presented in figure 15 and table 8. Consistent with the reduction of revenues, the air freight 
segment has also been losing relative importance in the operating profit, while the ocean freight 
has been increasing over the period. The logistics segment has been responsible for negative 
operating profits since 2012, but it assumed a positive value of ₣2.1Mn in 2015. In terms of 
operating margin, air freight has the highest margin, followed by ocean freight. In all margins, 
there has been an upward trend, mostly related to the cost optimization policy the company has 
been developing. 
Regarding total operating costs, these have increased from 2011 to 2013, followed by a 
downward trend until 2015, year in which operating costs decreased by 13%. The cost structure 
is mainly dependent on COGS, representing 77% of the total value in 2015, followed by labor, 
accounting for 16%. In absolute terms, Depreciation/Amortization have been increasing 
constantly, presenting a CAGR of 1.69% for 2010-15. Labor costs have also been following this 
upward trend with a CAGR of 0.12%.  In terms of costs as a percentage of revenues, the 
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Figure 16: Cost segmentation for the period 2010-15, in CHF 
millions 




The following table compares key ratios across the previous 3 years as well as with the industry. 
In terms of profitability, despite the positive trend, Panalpina still presents lower gross, operating 
and net margins than the industry median. ROE and Pretax ROA have been steadily increasing, 
and, with the exception of 2013, they are similar to the industry median. The current ratio is 
higher than the industry indicating that the company meets its short term obligations in an easier 
way. The leverage ratios are considerably lower than the industry, indicating the low, close to 
zero, long-term debt of Panalpina. Operating ratios seem to be in line with the industry median, 
except the account payables days, which are significantly lower. 
Table 9: Key operating and financial ratios 
Source: Reuters 
Ratios 2013 2014 2015
Industry 
Median
Gross Margin 23.1% 23.6% 25.2% 46.9% 
Operating Margin 0.7% 1.7% 2.0% 5.8% 
Net Margin 0.2% 1.3% 1.5% 2.1% 
ROE 1.7% 12.3% 12.9% 12.6% 
Pretax ROA 1.8% 5.9% 6.4% 5.5% 
Reinvestment Rate - 3.1% 0.7% 3.7% 
Current Ratio 1.46 1.52 1.56 1.02 
Assets/Equity 2.79 2.68 2.69 3.04 
Debt/Equity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
Avg. A/R Days 59.8 59.7 63.0 62.9 
Inv Turnover 58.9 50.5 49.3 49.3 
Avg. A/P Days 40.5 39.7 40.9 104.1 
Fixed Asset Turnover 54.25 60.10 64.08 6.61 







4.2.5. Stock Performance 
From 2010 to the valuation date, Panalpina had a cumulative return of 37% while the DJTI had 
68% and the Swiss Market Index (SMI) presented 18%. In absolute terms, the stock price 
increased by a 1.72 factor over this same period, achieving ₣105 on the day prior to the 
valuation.   EPS changed  expressively  over  the  last  years,  assuming the lowest value in 2012, 
-₣3.05, while Dividends, except for 2010 when no dividend was declared, tend to be more 
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Figure 18: Cumulative monthly Stock Returns of Panalpina, DJTI, and 
S&P500 Index, for the period 01-Jan-2010 to 23-Mar-2016 
Figure 19: Basic EPS and DPS for the period 2010-15, in CHF 
Figure 9: Panalpina’s closing price for the period 01-Jan-2014 to 23-Mar-2016, in CHF 
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5. Deal Rationale 
Traditionally, UPS core and original segment has been CEP, accounting for 63% and 21% of 
total revenues in 2015, respectively. The company entered the freight business in 2004 with the 
acquisition of Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, and despite its development, UPS has used this 
acquisition strategy to grow and consolidate in this industry, by acquiring companies with deep 
expertise and know-how (annex 8).  
When looking at market growth rates as presented in section 3.1.2., it becomes clear that the non-
core segment of UPS presents much higher CAGRs than the CEP for 2014-19. This is supportive 
and indicative that UPS should develop this segment.  
In fact, one can argue that Coyote’s acquisition occurred in 2015, already shows the interest on 
the segment and complements UPS in terms of road freight and logistics area. However, 
Panalpina, being one of top 5 companies in air and ocean freight segments, with more than 80 
years of expertise, emerges as the indicated company to strengthen UPS position in this fast 
growing, asset-light business.  
Panalpina, having a strong and premium reputation, will not only enable a higher level of cross-
sale to clients, through the possibility of integrated solutions, but also benefit UPS in terms of 
asset and network utilization. On the other hand, UPS will impose its efficient cost structure, 
seen through the considerably higher margins than the industry, and its leading power position in 





In order to have a clear idea about the impact of the fuel prices in the T&L sector, I retrieved 
data since 2006 from the ARs so that the 2008-09 change in fuel price was incorporated. 
Depending on the detail available in each company’s AR, you can find more or less segmented 
rubrics. Nonetheless, revenue estimation tries to be as detailed and segmented as possible, which 
then converts to a consolidated base when estimating costs, capex and working capital14. 
6.1. United Parcel Service 
6.1.1. Cash-flow Projections 
6.1.1.1. Revenues 
As explained, UPS has three separate segments: U.S. Domestic Package, International Package, 
and Supply Chain & Freight. In the company’s annual reports, further comprehensive 
segmentation can be found as described in table 10. 
                                                             
14 The explicit period in both valuations is 5 years (2016-20). Other sources, such as Bloomberg and Reuters, were 
used when estimating the cost of capital and they are properly identified. All valuations were made under March, 24 
2016 
Table 10: Description of UPS’s segments 
32 
 
In addition, there is detailed information in the AR regarding price and volume for the first 5 
subsegments presented in the previous table, while the remaining are presented with the total 
revenue information. Hence, the estimation process was more detailed for the first 5 
subsegments, which accounted for 83% of total revenues, in 2015. 
The following graphs and table present the estimated trends and historical pattern of the 
subsegments analyzed.  
6 570 8 159
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For all the subsegments in the Domestic segment, volumes were assumed to continue the high 
growth trend, which started in 2014 (volume growth reached 6.4%), until 2017 and then reduce 
to stable growth rates, presenting 3.6% in 2020. The reason behind this two-stage growth model 
comes from the deep increase in premium air products and continued growth in e-commerce and 
overall retail sales, powered by lower average prices per piece, mainly related with the decrease 
in the price of fuel, which increases the number of shipments15. Out of the three subsegments, 
Deferred presents the higher growth in volume, as can be seen in annex 9. The average revenue 
per piece is related to changes in fuel prices as seen in the historical data from annex 9. With this 
in mind, the price projections made for 2016-20 account for a reduction in 2016, and gradual 
increase onwards. Depending on each subsegment, this change is more or less emphasized taking 
into account historical values, annex 9. Total operation days, which are used when computing 
Total Revenue, were assumed to be the same as 2015. 
In the International Segment, Domestic and Export revenues were estimated with a similar 
methodology to the domestic one. Volume presents a two-stage growth, with higher rates until 
2018, partially related to the continued strength made by UPS in the B2C sector and the strong 
                                                             
15 As the fuel price increases, the predicted number of shipments will not sustain the high growth and stable growth 
rates will appear 
Table 11: Annual Percentage change in Revenues per segment and subsegment, including when possible volume and price changes, 
for the projected period, 2016-20   
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demand from new clients in Healthcare16. Price follows an analogous model from the Domestic 
segment, decreasing in 2016 and gradually increasing thereafter.  The subsegment Cargo is 
estimated directly from its revenue value and it is based on historical values as well as the overall 
international trend. Again, Total operation days were assumed to be the same as 2015. 
At last, Supply Chain and Freight is estimated to have high growth rates mainly due to the 
Coyote acquisition, which occurred in 2015. According to UPS’s beliefs, total synergies are 
expected to be fully realized until 2018, hence I present increasing growth rates until such year, 
which tend to stabilize until 2020. Coyote’s acquisition impacts the subsegments Forwarding 
and Logistics as well as Freight. For the detailed revenue analysis please refer to annex 9. 
Revenue estimation is one of the critical components of the whole valuation process since 
Revenues are the base for other estimated values used in the Cash-flow approach. Therefore, 
during this process, UPS’s forward looking estimates and market growth rates were always taken 
into account. Such comparison is presented in annex 10. 
 
6.1.1.2. Operational Costs & Margins 
COGS, SG&A, Labor and Other Operating Expenses were estimated to change by the percentage 
of revenues. After analyzing the historical percentage of these costs in revenues, it was assumed 
the average percentage 2013-15, hence, 20.0%, 4.1%, 53.2% and 7.8%, respectively. 
Depreciation and Amortization costs were estimated individually. Depreciation was assumed to 
be the average percentage of Net PPE 2011-15, that is 9.3%, while Amortization was predicted 
by the average percentage of Net Intangible Assets 2011-15, assuming 28.6%. 
Since the operational costs are dependent on revenues, EBITDA and Operational profit margins 
are stable across the explicit period, around 15% and 11-12%, respectively. 
 
 
                                                             
16 The increase in volume also seems to be explained by the lower price, hence, as the fuel cost increases, high 





6.1.1.3. Capital Expenditures & Net working Capital 
Please refer to annex 11 for detail on the computations of these items. 
6.1.1.4. Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
Based on the previous projections, and assuming a tax rate of approximately 34%, average 
effective tax rate 2013-15, I compute the following FCFF presented in table 12. The growth rate 
assumed in the terminal value, 1.98%, comes from IMF’s projection of GDP growth in 2021 for 
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Table 12: Free Cash Flow to the Firm and its components, for the historical year 2015 and the projected 2016-20 
6.1.2. WACC-method 
6.1.2.1. Cost of Capital 
The WACC obtained to discount the FCFF was 6.33% and it was based on the following 
assumptions: 
(USD Mn) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Revenues:
U.S. Domestic Package 36,747        38,153        40,317        42,522          44,217        45,936             
International Package 12,149        12,484        13,224        14,203          15,175        16,018             
Supply Chain & Freight 9,467          10,035        10,838        11,999          12,830        13,480             
Total Revenue 58,363     60,672     64,379     68,723       72,222     75,435         
COGS 10,525        12,134        12,875        13,744          14,444        15,086             
SG&A 2,422          2,477          2,628          2,806            2,948          3,080               
Labor Costs 31,028        32,299        34,272        36,585          38,448        40,158             
Other operating expenses 4,636          4,743          5,033          5,372            5,646          5,897               
EBITDA 9,752       9,020       9,571       10,217       10,737     11,214         
Depreciation/Amortization 2,084          2,222          2,230          2,259            2,303          2,358               
EBIT 7,668       6,798       7,341       7,958         8,434       8,857           
Taxes 2,498          2,337          2,524          2,736            2,899          3,045               
NOPLAT 5,170       4,461       4,818       5,222         5,535       5,812           
Depreciation/Amortization 2,084          2,222          2,230          2,259            2,303          2,358               
Operating Cash Flow 7,254       6,683       7,047       7,481         7,837       8,170           
CAPEX 2,379 -         2,800 -         2,518 -         2,687 -           2,824 -         2,950 -              
Inv in Working Capital 254 -            122             133 -            156 -              125 -            115 -                 
Free Cash Flow to the firm 4,004       4,397       4,638         4,888       5,105           
Terminal value 119,804       
EstimateHistorical




6.1.2.2. Equity Valuation 
With the previous cash-flow and cost of capital assumptions, we obtain an Enterprise Value of 
$107,258Mn and an Equity per share of $107.91.  
 
Table 14: WACC-method Valuation Output – Enterprise Value, Equity Value and Equity value per share 
 
6.1.2.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
The WACC and the terminal growth rate are two major inputs of the valuation. Hence, a 
sensitivity analysis was made to these components, ranging 0.5 p.p.. As a result, price per share 
varies from $86.74 to $141.69, meaning that the estimates are extremely sensitive to the 
parameters analyzed. 
(USD Mn) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Free Cash Flow to the firm 4,004       4,397       4,638         4,888       5,105           
Terminal value 119,804       
WACC 6.33%
Discounted Cash flow 3,766          3,889          3,859            3,825          91,920             
Entreprise Value 107,258     
Non controling interest 21              
Net debt 11,604       
Equity value 95,633       
Outstanding shares 886            
Equity value per share 107.91       
1.48% 1.73% 1.98% 2.23% 2.48%
5.83% 109,190   114,908   121,370     128,730   137,190   
6.08% 103,171   108,219   113,883     120,284   127,575   
6.33% 97,773     102,258   107,258     112,870   119,210   
6.58% 92,906     96,912     101,355     106,309   111,868   
6.83% 88,494     92,092     96,062       100,463   105,371   





1.48% 1.73% 1.98% 2.23% 2.48%
5.83% 110.09     116.55     123.84       132.14     141.69     
6.08% 103.30     109.00     115.39       122.61     130.84     
6.33% 97.21       102.27     107.91       114.25     121.40     
6.58% 91.72       96.24       101.25       106.84     113.12     
6.83% 86.74       90.80       95.28         100.25     105.78     





Figure 12: Sensitivity analysis to the Terminal Growth rate and WACC  
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6.1.3. APV Method 
To compute the Equity value per share though the APV method, we first need to compute the 
debt value per year, so that interest tax shields can be computed. In order to have an idea about 
the change in debt levels, please refer to annex 13, where Dividends, Stock Repurchase and Debt 
are analyzed. 
 
6.1.3.1. Cost of Capital 
The Unlevered Cost of Equity obtained to discount the FCFF was 6.48% and it was based on the 





6.1.3.2. Equity Valuation 
One must first discount the FCFF by the unlevered cost of capital, compute the annual debt tax 
shield, including its terminal value, and discount them by the cost of debt, while accounting for 
the costs of financial distress17. With such procedure, I obtain an Enterprise Value of 





                                                             
17 Computed as explained in section 2.1.1.2., using default probabilities retrieved from Thomson Reuters and CFD 
of 7.5%. For the terminal value, it was used the 10yr default probability rate of UPS 





Table 16: APV-method Valuation Output – Enterprise Value, Equity Value and Equity value per share, in USD Millions, except 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Free Cash Flow to the firm 4,004          4,397       4,638       4,888       5,105            
Terminal value 115,746       
Unlevered Cost of Equity 6.48%
Unlevered Entreprise Value 103,583      
Total Debt 14,961        15,412    15,590    15,591    15,341          
Interest payments 492              507          513          513          505               
Interest tax shield 169              174          176          176          174               
Terminal Value 13,507          
Cost of Debt 3.29%
PV Tax Shield 12,278        
Default Probability 0.0% 0.5% 1.3% 2.3% 4.0%
 Costs of Financial Distress (7.5%) -               1.55         4.36         8.43         15.15            
Terminal Value (default prob @ 17.87%) 1,625.34      
Risk Free 1.88%
Pv expected bankrupcty 1,508          
Financing side effects 10,770        
APV Enterprise Value 114,353   
Non controling interest 21                
Net debt 11,604        
Equity value 102,728      
Outstanding shares 886              
Equity value per share 115.92     




6.1.4. Relative Valuation  
UPS is a very specific company, operating in the three aforementioned segments and being 
considered the industry leader regarding operating margin and efficiency levels. For these 
reasons, it is difficult to find the correct peer group. Under a first approach, a group of 7 
companies were selected, described in annex 14.  In this already selected group, some companies 
operate in the same segment as UPS, while others operate only on one or two. After computing a 
first multiple valuation, and achieving a wide range of values, also presented in annex 14, the 
group was further restricted to 5 companies, 4 of them operate in the same 3 subsegments as 
UPS, and 1 operates only on the CEP area, which represents 84% of UPS’s revenues in 2015. 
The selected multiples benefit forward and EV-ratios as explained in 2.1.2.. P/E multiple was 
included to demonstrate how distant it can be from the EV-multiples, misleading the valuation. 
According to the results, share price should be between $94.19 and $103.38, disregarding the 
P/E, and looking at the median18. 
                                                             
18 Average can be misleading due to extreme values while value weighted can incorporate too much weight on a 
specific company, since they have significant different market capitalizations (annex 14) 
Forward multiples EV/EBIT EV/ FCFF P/E
FedEx Corporation 21.32 x 80.61 x 15.18 x
Deutsche Post (DHL) 12.40 x 25.26 x 13.15 x
TNT 28.76 x n.a. 38.56 x
Post NL 6.02 x 22.24 x 9.03 x
Transforce Inc 15.19 x 11.20 x 13.03 x
Median 15.19 x 23.75 x 13.15 x
Average 16.74 x 34.83 x 17.79 x
Value weighted 20.16 x 49.25 x 18.81 x
Median 103.38 94.19 62.49
Average 115.28 144.25 84.53
Value weighted 141.54 209.43 89.40
Price per share ($)





 The following graph shows a summary of the different valuation methods used in this section as 
well as two market prices19. The fair value of UPS seems to be between $94.19 and $115.92. In 
order to achieve our fair value price per share, I decided to use a weighted average, so that 60% 
is attributed to the WACC-method, 20% to APV, and 10% to each of the selected multiples. The 
result is a price per share of $107.69 and an EV of $107,060Mn.  
                                                             
19 Closing price of the last trading day before the valuation: 23-Mar-2016, and the 30 day weighted average closing 







DCF-WACC APV EV/EBIT EV/ FCFF Last Trading Day 30 day Weighted
Avg. Vol.
Share Price
Figure 13: Summary of UPS’s Valuation  
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6.2. Panalpina World Transport 
6.2.1. Cash-flow Projections 
6.2.1.1. Revenues 
Revenues were estimated taking into account the specific information provided in the company’s 
AR, that is, volume and total revenue in the air and ocean freight and total revenue in the 
logistics segment. In the first two mentioned segments, it was possible to compute an implicit 
average historical price per year, leading to better estimates, while in the logistics segment, it 
was only estimated total revenue.  
The following graph and table show the estimated revenue values per segment for the explicit 
period. The volume in the air freight segment is estimated to sharply increase in 2016 and 
stabilize until 2020, assuming a volume growth rate of 6%. The high growth rates in the early 
estimated years come from management’s belief about volume in the perishables sector, which 
will reduce the dependence on the cyclical business20. Regarding the volume in ocean freight, it 
is estimated to have increasing growth rates, achieving 6% in 2020, mostly due to market growth 
rate. Panalpina believes that it will be a challenge not to lose market share in this segment, due to 
the high consolidation trend expected to continue in the future years. Nevertheless, it is also 
mentioned that the company will increase customer segmentation in this division, leading to 
stronger players and being able to offer integrated solutions, which will most likely leave this 
segment profitability unchanged.   
The estimated price in both freight divisions deeply depends on the fuel price, which is expected 
to further decrease in 2016 and gradually increase until 2020. It was assumed that the impact on 
price is the same for both segments, which leads to equal growth rates regarding the average 
price. 
The logistics division of Panalpina has been estimated to grow at increasing positive rates until 
2018 and stabilize thereafter reaching a growth rate of 5% in 2020. This values are mostly based 
on the company’s beliefs regarding the already established trends of distributed manufacturing 
and mass personalization, deeply related to the high growth of e-commerce, 3D printing 
technologies and customized products.  
                                                             
20 Moreover, the company acquired in 2015, Airflo, Kenya’s second largest air freight forwarder specialized in the 






As previously explained, revenue estimation is one of the key factors when valuing a company. 
Please look at annex 15 for this comparison.  
 
6.2.1.2. Operational Costs & Margins 
COGS, SG&A, Labor and Other Operating Expenses were estimated to change by the percentage 
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Total Revenue
Air Freight Ocean Freight Logistics
Figure 14: Revenues per segment, for the period 2006-15 (historical) and 2016-20 (projections), in CHF millions 
Table 18: Annual Percentage change in Revenues per segment and subsegment, including when possible volume and price 
changes, for the projected period, 2016-20   
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the average percentage 2013-15, implying that such costs grow at the same rate as revenues21. 
For COGS, SG&A, Labor and Other Operating Expenses the average percentage used was 
75.6%, 6.3%, 14.7% and 0.4%, respectively. 
Depreciation and Amortization costs were estimated individually. Depreciation was assumed to 
be the average percentage of Net PPE 2011-15, that is 28.8%, while Amortization was predicted 
by the average percentage of Net Intangible Assets 2011-15, assuming 36.6%. 
Profitability margins are slowly increasing, mostly due to the change in labor costs, attaining 
values between 1.8-2.4% for operating margin and 2.5-3.1% for EBITDA. In 2015, both margins 
were higher than the estimated ones, which is justifiable considering the significant decrease in 
costs, specifically in COGS that decreased 14%.  
 
6.2.1.3. Capital Expenditures & Net Working Capital 
Please refer to annex 16 for detail on the computation of these items. 
                                                             
21 The exception to this procedure was the computation of COGS, which was assumed to be the average percentage 
of revenues from 2014-15, since it best represents the future expected trend according to the management. Also 
Labor costs were assumed to gradually decrease to the 2013-15 average assumed in 2020 due to the low flexibility 
around this parameter 
6,710   6,590   
5,738   6,054   
6,465   
6,913   
7,403   
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Operating Expenses & Margins 
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Other operating expense Operating profit mg
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Figure 15: Operational Costs in CHF millions, EBITDA and Operating Profit margins, for the historical period 2013-15 and 
the projected period 2016-20 
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6.2.1.4. Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
Based on the previous projections, and assuming a tax rate of approximately 25%, average 
effective tax rate 2014-15, it was computed the FCFF as presented in table 19. The growth rate 
assumed in the terminal value, 1.80%, is the IMF’s estimate of GDP growth in 2021 for 
Switzerland. For a complete look at the financial statements please look at annex 17. 
 
Table 19: Panalpina’s Free Cash Flow to the firm and its components, for the historical year 2015 and the projected period 
2016-20 
6.2.2. WACC-method 
In this dissertation, it was opted to use method B as described in section 2.2.5., implying the 
forecast of exchange rates. This step was performed under the theory Uncovered Interest Rate 
Parity22, through the following formula: 
 
                                                             
22 This theory states that, under efficient markets, the difference in interest rates between two countries is equal to 
the expected change in exchange rates between its currencies 
(CHF Mn) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Revenue:
Air Freight 2,646          2,800             3,011          3,224          3,468          3,732          
Ocean Freight 2,587          2,713             2,890          3,094          3,329          3,582          
Logistics 623             654                693             741             778             817             
Total Revenue 5,855       6,167         6,594       7,059       7,576       8,131       
COGS 4,382          4,662             4,985          5,336          5,727          6,146          
SG&A 386             389                416             445             478             513             
Labor Costs 896             937                996             1,059          1,121          1,195          
Other operating expenses 23               22                  23               25               27               29               
EBITDA 168          157            174          194          223          248          
Depreciation/Amortization 51               44                  45               47               50               53               
EBIT 117          113            129          146          173          195          
Taxes 29               28                  32               37               43               49               
NOPLAT 88            85              97            110          130          147          
Depreciation/Amortization 51               44                  45               47               50               53               
Operating Cash Flow 139          129            142          157          180          199          
CAPEX 17 -              47 -                 50 -              54 -              58 -              62 -              
Inv in Working Capital 25               33 -                 13 -              15 -              18 -              18 -              
Free Cash Flow to the firm (CHF) 148          49              78            89            104          119          
Terminal Value 2,143          
Historical Estimate
𝐹𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 ∗  
(1 + 𝑟𝐶𝐻𝐹 ,𝑡)






I estimate that the Swiss Franc will strengthen against the U.S. dollar, reaching an exchange rate 
USD1.1701/CHF by 2020. This estimates are close to the futures contract available in the 
market, as observable in figure 27.   
6.2.2.1. Cost of Capital 
Method B requires that the cost of capital used corresponds to the U.S. one. Hence, the WACC 
obtained to discount the FCFF was 7.46%23, as detailed in table 20: 
                                                             
23 Assumed that the proportion of Net Debt is 0%, since this value is negative and not significant. Hence, the WACC 
equals the cost of equity, 7.46% 
Component Value Description Source 
Cost of Debt 1.14%  RBC Capital Markets 
Tax Rate 25% Average Effective tax rate 2014-15 Panalpina’s financials 
MV of Net Debt -₣392Mn  MV Debt - Cash and Cash Equivalents Panalpina’s financials 
Cost of Equity 7.46% Risk Free 1.88% 10 year Treasury Gov U.S. Treasury Gov 
Market Risk 7.25% Historical Average S&P500 Damodaran 
MRP 5.37% Market Risk - Risk Free  
Levered Beta 1.04 5yr regression, monthly data Reuters 
MV of Equity ₣2,500Mn Market Capitalization Reuters 
 
Figure 16: USD/CHF exchange rate for the historical 01-Jan-2014 to 23-Mar-2016 and the estimated 2016-20, as the future 
contracts for the same period 
Table 20: WACC components 
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6.2.2.2. Equity Valuation 
With the previous cash-flow and cost of capital assumptions, I obtain an Enterprise Value of 
$2,132Mn and an Equity per share of $106.25.  For detail on method A, please refer to annex 18. 
 
Table 21: WACC-method Valuation Output – Enterprise Value, Equity Value and Equity value per share 
6.2.2.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
As in UPS, a sensitivity analysis was performed to the WACC and the terminal growth rate, with 
a range of 0.5 p.p.. As a result, price per share varies from $93.21 to $124.87. 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Free Cash Flow to the firm (CHF) 49            78           89            104              119           
Terminal Value 2,143        
Future rates 1.0424    1.0666    1.0901     1.1270        1.1701     
Free Cash Flow to the firm (USD) 51            84           97            117              2,647        
WACC 7.46%
Entreprise Value 2,132      
Non controling interest 12            
Net debt 402 -        
Equity value 2,522      
Outstanding shares 24            
Equity value per share (USD) 106.25  
1.30% 1.55% 1.80% 2.05% 2.30%
6.96% 2,170     2,257       2,353     2,458     2,574      
7.21% 2,072     2,151       2,237     2,332     2,436      
7.46% 1,982     2,054       2,132     2,217     2,311      
7.71% 1,899     1,965       2,036     2,113     2,198      
7.96% 1,822     1,882       1,947     2,018     2,094      





1.30% 1.55% 1.80% 2.05% 2.30%
6.96% 107.87   111.53     115.55   119.97   124.87    
7.21% 103.74   107.06     110.69   114.66   119.05    
7.46% 99.94     102.96     106.25   109.85   113.79    
7.71% 96.44     99.20       102.20   105.46   109.02    






Price per share (USD)
Figure 17: Sensitivity analysis to the Terminal Growth rate and WACC 
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6.2.4. Relative Valuation  
Once again, the choice for the peer group is difficult considering the different segments. 
Nevertheless, I first proposed a group of 7 companies that operate in the same segment as 
Panalpina and are subject to the same conditions, described in annex 19. However, under this 
first selection, two companies, DHL and TNT, strongly operate in the CEP segment24, and for 
this reason were excluded from the restricted group. The selected multiples correspond to the 
ones presented in UPS’s relative valuation, and are also based on forward ratios. Under the 
median values, I obtained a range of $93.46-113.96 per share. Out of these indicative market 
prices, I tend to disregard the Price-Earnings-ratio, since it is more susceptible to manipulation 
and accounting tricks. For a complete description of the selected peer group and multiples, please 
consider annex 19. 
                                                             
24 CEP segment was responsible for 51.80% and 93.25% of 2015 Revenues for DHL and TNT Express, respectively 
Forward multiples EV/EBIT EV/ FCFF P/E
Kuehne+Nagel 16.52 x 21.08 x 24.70 x
Kerry Logistics Network Ltd 10.80 x n.a. 15.36 x
AP Moeller Maersk 28.76 x 71.96 x 18.34 x
DSV 20.76 x 148.20 x 24.67 x
Expeditors International 11.20 x 16.33 x 25.50 x
Median 16.52 x 46.52 x 24.67 x
Average 17.61 x 64.39 x 21.71 x
Value weighted 17.26 x 49.41 x 23.48 x
Median 97.30 113.96 93.46
Average 102.61 151.43 82.25
Value weighted 100.91 120.02 88.93
Price per share ($)




The following graph shows a summary of the different valuation methods used in this section as 
well as two market prices25. The fair value of Panalpina seems to be between $93.46 and 
$113.96.  To achieve our fair value price per share, I decided to use a weighted average, so that 
60% is attributed to the WACC-method B, 20% to method A, and 10% to each of the selected 
multiples. The result is a price per share of $106.20 and an EV of $2,131Mn.  
  
                                                             
25 Closing price of the last trading day before the valuation: 23-Mar-2016, and the 30 day weighted average closing 













Figure 18: Summary of Panalpina’s Valuation  
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6.3. Valuation of the Merged Entity 
6.3.1. No synergies 
Under this section, I will assume the value of the merged entity is simply the sum of the two 
individual values, as if no external or internal forces impact the result. Hence, the Enterprise 
Value of the Merged Entity is $109,194Mn and its Equity Value reaches $97,959Mn. 
 
  6.3.2. Synergy Valuation 
There are specific factors between UPS and Panalpina that allow the companies to be more than 
the sum of its parts. In fact, I believe that both operational and financial synergies can be found 
in this acquisition. The methodology used to compute these synergies was based on academic 
literature, section 2.2.3., and on recent transactions that occurred in the market26, when there is 
enough detail to understand the synergy valuation. I assume that it will take three years to realize 
the full synergies, incurring into integration costs during that period. 
                                                             
26 Out of the selected deals, the most relevant ones are the following transactions (bidder-target): DSV-Uti 
Worldwide; XPO Logistics-Conway; UPS-Coyote; Kuehne+Nagel-Retrans; XPO-Norbert Dentressangle; Radiant 
Logistics-Wheels Group. For the complete information please look at Annex 20 












UPS Panalpina UPS Panalpina
Enterprise Value EV Merged
Entity
Net Debt Equity Value
Merged
Entity
Figure 19: Valuation of the merged company with no synergies 
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6.3.2.1. Operating Synergies 
6.3.2.1.1. Revenue Synergies 
As explained in section 5 one major advantage of combing these two companies is the access to 
better cross sale opportunities by being able to offer an integrated approach, which is extremely 
valued by customers in their supply chain area. Hence, I believe volume will increase 
significantly, as customers will centralize their operations in the new, stronger company and 
decrease the use of several companies. This reasoning is only significant for the FF&L, since the 
CEP segments offered by UPS will not suffer from this acquisition. 
With this, the total FF&L, which includes the Supply Chain segment of UPS and all Panalpina’s 
segments, will have enhanced revenues. Specifically, I assumed that revenues will increase by 
0.3% in 2016, 0.4% in 2017 and 0.5% from 2018 onwards. This represents an increase of 
approximately $360Mn over the period 2016-20. 
The increase in revenues is small but representative, and indicates a conservative approach to the 
real number. Revenue synergies are the ones that management most often overestimates and 
according to academic literatures are the most difficult to realize. Hence, I present a conservative 
approach regarding this topic.  
 
Figure 20: Revenue increase in the FF&L segment, and Total Revenues, in USD million for the projected 2016-20 
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Since revenues increase, operating expenses and other items estimated as a percentage of 
revenues shall increase as well. In fact, the impact on sales led to an extra cost of $152, 18, 137, 
25Mn27 in COGS, SG&A, Labor Costs and other operational expenses, respectively.  
Additionally, capex also increases, since they were estimated based on revenues, in $13Mn over 
the same period28. NWC is also modified by the revenue synergy, increasing by $65Mn. 
By performing a DCF-WACC valuation, the value of the synergy can be materialized resulting 
in $110Mn.  
6.3.2.1.2. Cost Synergies 
UPS has a leading operating margin in the industry, based on the constant optimization and 
automation of its network, which boosts its operational efficiency and adds value. Panalpina is 
engaged in a complex restructuring plan, Operations Transformation Program, whose objective 
is to increase productivity, optimize costs and generate solid FCFF. It seems that there is the 
structure and the plan to optimize Panalpina, however the company lacks the ability to execute it. 
The emergence of UPS may solve this issue, while undertaking the OTP plan and use their best 
knowledge to optimize Panalpina’s costs by being a key leader in the industry. Moreover, the 
combination of these two companies will result in a higher bargaining power, which specifically 
applies to COGS and SG&A. In addition, overlaps in labor positions and the introduction of more 
automation processes in the target company, will reduce costs with labor. 
The following table presents the estimated cost synergy per item29. As observable, the complete 
synergy effect will occur in 2018, year after which the synergy rates stabilize, assuming that 
some costs are not possible to immediately change due to contract obligations. COGS and Labor 
costs are estimated to decrease by small amounts, 0.05% and 0.10%, respectively, while SG&A 
is estimated to decrease by 1.5% in the first year. Other operating expenses do not reflect any 
synergy, since it is not clear what they represent, and one should not make inappropriate guesses.  
                                                             
27 Present Value of the total expenses for the explicit period 2016-20 
28 CAPEX is not obliged to increase in such situation, but it was recomputed it in order to be consistent with the 
estimation method and for companies not want to decrease their CAPEX-revenue ratio. The increase in CAPEX 
directly affects the value of depreciation/amortization which increases $2Mn over the period 
29 The stand alone cost values represent the costs after the revenue synergy, so that the effect of the cost synergy is 
not overestimated. Due to the size difference between the companies, in order not to overstate the value created by 
the cost synergy, it was decided to apply the cost reduction only on the proportion represented by the FF&L segment 
on total revenues of UPS, dependent on each estimated year 
53 
 
These cost reduction represents savings in the amount of $98Mn, in present value terms, over the 
period 2016-20. The decrease in costs affect the working capital, which reflects a need to further 
invest on the same around $5Mn. As a whole, the cost synergy yields a value of $838Mn for the 
resulting company. 
  
6.3.2.1.3. EBITDA Margin 
Both the mentioned synergies change the EBITDA margin, achieving a difference 7 p.p. in the 
last estimated year. The small changes in the EBITDA margin reflect the conservative approach. 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Stand Alone 17,014      18,222         19,602      20,943      22,327   
decrease -0.05% -0.10% -0.15% -0.15% -0.15%
Synergy 17,010      18,214         19,590      20,929      22,312   
Stand Alone 2,885        3,076           3,296        3,492        3,686     
decrease -1.50% -2.00% -2.50% -2.50% -2.50%
Synergy 2,873        3,058           3,272        3,466        3,657     
Stand Alone 33,276      35,334         37,739      39,711      41,556   
decrease -0.10% -0.15% -0.25% -0.25% -0.25%
Synergy 33,288      35,352         37,758      39,732      41,577   
Stand Alone 4,769        5,063           5,406        5,684        5,939     
decrease 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%








Table 23: Cost Synergy – Absolut and Percentage Decrease for the projected 2016-20 
Figure 21: Comparison of the EBITDA margin of the merged entity with the stand alone companies from the 
historical 2013-15 to the projected 2016-20 
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6.3.2.2. Financial Synergies 
As explained in section 2.2.3., most financial synergies come from the cash slack, debt capacity30 
and tax considerations. The first potential synergy, which should create value when one company 
has high levels of excess cash but limited opportunities while the other has low cash levels but 
high opportunities, is assumed not to create value for the resulting company since both 
companies have the necessary cash levels for their investments levels.  Debt capacity will be one 
synergy driver, taking advantage from the non-optimal capital structure of Panalpina, and will be 
detailed below. At last, I present a tax dissynergy assuming an extremely conservative approach 
to the valuation. 
6.3.2.2.1. Tax Dissynergy 
Switzerland benefits from a low corporate income tax (CIT) rate of 8.5% as base rate, but with 
effective income tax rates varying between 12-24%, while U.S. has a CIT of 35%, also 
dependent on specific situations (Deloitte, 2015).  Panalpina and UPS, having a significant 
number of operations occurring outside their base country, present an effective tax rate of 25% 
and 34%, respectively. In order to assume the most conservative approach regarding the taxation, 
it was assumed that, after the integration, the Swiss-based company will change their taxation 
system to the U.S., hence it should pay the 34%. As one can expect this greatly creates a tax 
dissynergy for the resulting company31. The tax dissynergy is estimated to decrease the value of 
the company in $1,249Mn32. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this is an 
extremely conservative approach. 
6.3.2.2.2. Debt Capacity 
Debt capacity as a potential synergy can surge from either two components: 1) companies are not 
in their optimal capital structure and one has better access to capital markets; 2) companies 
operate in different businesses and their cash-flows do not correlate allowing them to have a 
stronger ability to increase debt, representing safer borrowers.  
Under our proposed transaction, the second argument is not valid since companies clearly 
operate in the same business and are subject to the same market conditions. However, the first 
                                                             
30 Diversification is being included in the debt capacity synergy 
31 It is estimated that taxes will increase $64Mn, under the 2016-20 period, compared to the no-synergy-scenario 
32 In order to correctly account for the value creation/destruction by the synergies, the tax effect was the first to be 
computed, followed by revenues, costs, and at last, the financial debt synergy 
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term is extremely interesting given Panalpina’s capital structure characteristics33. As observable 
in table 9 in section 4.2.4., the Debt-to-Equity ratio of Panalpina, 0%, is considerably lower than 
the industry median, 8%. I believe that the easy access of UPS to capital markets and to debt 
issue, will allow Panalpina to increase the proportion of debt to 8.8%, close to the industry 
median, implying an issue of $650Mn, which leads to a net debt of $248Mn.  
This increase in debt leads to changes in the capital structure of the company as a whole. In fact, 
the WACC, which under the no-synergy-scenario was 6.39%, changes to 6.34%, since the cheap 
component, debt, receives a higher proportion. This results in a value creation of $1,283Mn. 
6.3.2.3. Integration costs 
In order for the process to occur there are certain costs which will occur before, during and after 
the transaction. For dissertation purposes, I will assume that there will be a transaction fee, 
charged by the advisors involved in the transaction, 1%, which will be charged twice, assuming 
that each company has its own advisor.  
Moreover, there are some restructuring costs under which the merged entity incurs in order to 
achieve the desired synergies34. Apart from these and also extremely important are the culture 
costs35. Other costs include fees with lawyers and consultancy companies. 
This restructuring costs were assumed to occur until 2018, year in which full synergies are 
realized. These costs were estimated as a percentage of the target company EV36 and the total 





                                                             
33 UPS is assumed to already be in its optimal capital structure 
34 Some restructuring costs include: compensation benefits to contract termination, renegotiation costs with 
suppliers, communication costs, integrated information systems, among others 
35 Company culture should be given the right importance for two main reasons: a) employees may not understand 
the acquisition and if not engaged will not work for the desired results, and b) corporate culture between the two 
companies may be significantly different 
36 2%, 1.5%, 1%, for 2016-18, respectively 
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6.3.2.4. Attributed Synergies 
As explained in 2.2.3., it is important to separate and attribute each synergy to the company that 
contributes more to the same. Apart from the Revenue Synergy and Integration Costs, which 
were equally attributed, the remaining synergies were mostly assigned to UPS37.  
 
6.3.3. Summary 
As observable in figure 34, cost synergy is responsible for 85% of Total Synergy, with taxes 
representing a negative proportion of -127%, revenues 11% and financial synergies 131%. The 
total value of the synergy is $982Mn, while the net synergy achieves $839Mn. 
                                                             
37Tax dissynergy was completely assigned to UPS due to the tax rate change, while the value of the financial 
synergy was assumed to be 70% dependent on UPS, since this company is the one with better access to capital 






Table 24:  Synergies’ distribution to each company, Net 
synergy in USD million 
















Tax Dis-Synergy Synergy Total Synergy Integration
Costs
Net Synergy
Figure 23: Breakdown of synergy created by the merged company 
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Deal Value 2,555   2,729    3,014     3,224     3,359   
% total synergies 4% 25% 59% 84% 100%
% synergies attribitued to Panalpina 5% 30% 70% 100% 119%
Premium
last trading day 0% 7% 18% 26% 31%
30 day weighted average by volume 6% 14% 25% 34% 40%
Gain 804     630       346       135        0         
7. The Transaction 
7.1. Deal Price & Structure 
Setting the price for a deal is never an easy task. However, there are certain boundaries which are 
easy to understand, such as the minimum and the maximum bid prices. Under the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis38, the minimum bid price should be the stock’s price of the last trading day, 
or a weighted average of the last 30 days by volume. In a business point of view, the maximum 
price should be the one that incorporates all the synergies estimated by the transaction and the 
estimated value of the target company, so that the bidder does not lose value with the transaction.  
Figure 35 displays a range of possible bid values. The minimum price corresponds to the closing 
price of the last trading day, while the maximum includes all the synergies. In between I propose 
3 different prices, which were chosen taking into account the median of the premiums in the 






In order to protect the shareholders of UPS, I decided that it is more correct to base the bid price 
on its attributed synergies, while still presenting an interesting premium to the shareholders. 
Hence, I suggest a bid price of $127.00, option B, corresponding to ₣123.84, converting at the 
exchange rate used under the valuation. With this, the transaction is expected to create a gain of 
                                                             
38 This theory implies that stock market is efficient, incorporating all relevant available public information about an 
a specific asset, hence, stocks trade at their fair value 
Min A B C Max
Bid Price ($) 107.7 115.0 127.0 135.9 141.6
Figure 24: Bid price analysis, including the percentage of synergies paid, the premium and the gain for UPS 
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$346Mn39. These premiums are below recent transactions which occurred in the market, 
observable in the following figure and graph40. 
 
 
                                                             
39 Computed as: estimated stand-alone Equity Value of the target + Synergies - price paid 
40 In this section I only present the most important deals but please refer to the whole selection in annex 20, which 
was used to compute the multiples on table 33 
Bidder Radiant Logistics XPO Logistics Kuehne + Nagel UPS XPO Logistics DSV
Deal Value ($Mn) 74 3,520 235 1,800 3,014 1,350
EV / EBITDA (x) 5.2 10.1 n.a. n.a. 5.9 -43.6
EV / EBIT (x) 8.7 20.9 n.a. n.a. 11.2 n.a.
EV / Revenues (x) 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.3
Previous day 28% 34% 32% 50%
30 day Vol 
Weighted average 35% 38% 29% 34%
Private company Private company
Multiples
Premium
Figure 25: Selected M&A transactions, and respective description: target, bidder, deal value, multiples, premium 
Source: MergerMarket 




The transaction should be an all-cash deal where UPS acquires 100% of the Equity Value of 
Panalpina by $3,014Mn or ₣2,939Mn. This method of payment is preferred, enabling the 
company to send a confident message to the market, while using 50% of its Cash and Cash 
equivalents in 2015 and its short term investments to finance the deal. 
The transaction shall be presented as a tender offer to the company stockholders, entailing a 
special communication with the strongest shareholder of the company, Ernst Göhner Stiftung, 
and the board. 
7.2. Form of Integration 
As occurred with Coyote’s acquisition, I suggest that Panalpina operates as a subsidiary of UPS, 
implying that the current significant management is retained, managing the day-to-day 
operations, but the major strategic issues will depend upon UPS’s board. Moreover, UPS shall 
exchange their best knowledge and implement its efficient, below average cost structure. 
Nevertheless, Panalpina shall be recognized as a brand of the UPS group by clients, suppliers 
and other stakeholders, and should be seen as the already highly reputed company who has a 
stronger and highly credible organization to back its operations.   
7.3. Major Risks 
7.3.1. Shareholder Risk 
Since the transaction is an all-cash deal, it is known that the bidder shareholders take on more 
risk than a stock deal. One indicative measure to understand the risk that is being taken by the 
shareholders of the bidder company is the Shareholder Value at Risk (SVAR) proposed by 
(Rappaport & Sirower, 1998)41.  For the analyzed deal, this measure is 0.5%, a considerably low 
number mainly explained by the difference in the size of the bidder and the target. Hence, I 
expect the transaction to create value while not putting much at risk. 
 
                                                             
41 The formula is SVAR = Premium-Offered/Market-Capitalization of the Acquirer 
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7.3.2. Regulatory Risk 
Previous deals in the sector have been rejected by European Commission, such as the $6.77Bn 
bid for TNT Express by UPS in October 201242, hence, this is a major concern in M&A in the 
T&L industry. Nevertheless, I am confident that this deal will occur because: Panalpina is not as 
big as the rejected company; there are several players operating in the industry after the 
transaction; most recent transactions of the FF&L have been accepted.  
7.3.3. Other Risks 
Since the target has a shareholder who detains 45.9% of the company, there is a risk that the 
transaction may not be successful, if this shareholder imposes great difficulties. For this reason, 
it is highly recommended for UPS to keep an open dialogue while engaging this stockholder, 
bearing in mind that it should actively listen and understand some potential demands. 
Major operational and legal risks should be analyzed in the DD phase, so that the company 
knows exactly what is buying and if it is possible to extract all the estimated benefits.  
7.4. Alternatives 
As important as analyzing the selected target and bidder, it is also important to know if the 
bidder has any potential competition and if there is another target company as a BATNA 
alternative. 
7.4.1. Other Bidder 
Overall, Panalpina is a highly interesting player for both strategic firms, already operating in the 
industry, and financial players, such as Private Equity. Under the first group, major reasons rely 
on the consolidation trend present in the industry and offers may appear from players who have 
not recently acquired in this subsegment, such as DHL. PE groups may also have a special 
interest in the target since it has a low proportion of debt, and some players may be interested in 
optimizing its capital structure with an LBO.  
                                                             
42 EU expressed concerns with the size of TNT Express and the few players that would operate in the industry after 
the acquisition in certain countries 
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7.4.2. Other Target 
If the deal cannot be made due to shareholder disagreements but UPS is confident on the 
regulatory conditions, UPS may look to Kuehne+Nagel, bearing in mind that the deal would be 
larger since company is bigger. Other potential target could also be Expeditors. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This dissertation intended to study the potential acquisition of Panalpina by UPS, explaining the 
industry and the companies, while discussing cross-border valuation technicalities and specific 
M&A topics.  
Nevertheless, being this an academic thesis under a financial basis, there are some limitations. In 
fact, some legal issues were not deeply extended and studied and should be further examined, 
including the taxation agreement between both countries and the double taxation system. Under a 
prudential and conservative approach, I presented the worst case scenario: tax rate equals the 
U.S. rate.  
The industry is in clear consolidation and the moment is right for UPS to acquire a forwarding 
freight company. Panalpina surges as the strongest possibility, being a top 5 player in the 
segment but yet not too big to incur into any regulatory constraints.  
The transaction is expected to create net synergies of $839Mn, resulting form both operational 
and financial synergies. Hence, I propose a bid price of $127.00 or ₣123.84, implying a total deal 
value of $3,014Mn or ₣2,939Mn, which translates into a premium of 25% over the 30-day 







9.1. Annex 1: Industry Concentration 
The top 4 players in the Air and Ocean Freight segments are the same, however the overall 
market, is extremely competitive with several player competing for a significant position.  
AIR FREIGHT 
Rank Company Volume 
 (Thousands tonnes) 
1 DHL 2276 
2 Kuehne+Nagel 1194 
3 DB Schenker 1112 
4 Panalpina 858 
The logistics segment presents a highly dispersed market share, with several players competing 
in the market and holding small market shares. In fact, the biggest player achieves 7.4% of the 
market while the top 10 companies represent 20% of the market.  
Figure 26: Logistics Market share by revenues 
Source: DHL, Annual Report 2015, data refers to 2014 
OCEAN FREIGHT 
Rank Company Volume  
(Thousands tonnes) 
1 Kuehne+Nagel 3820 
2 DHL 2932 
3 DB Schenker 1983 
4 Panalpina 1607 
Table 26: Top 4 players by Volume in Air and Ocean Freight segment 






Norbert Dentressangle - 1.8%
Hitachi - 1.6%
Rhenus - 1.2%
SNCF Geodis - 1.2%
UPS - 1.1%
DB Schenker  - 1.1%




In the CEP segment, the market is clearly dominated by DHL, FedEx and UPS, representing 
84%, while TNT Express represents 5%.  
9.2. Annex 2: M&A activity in the T&L industry 
In 2015, the activity in the T&L industry inverted the downward trend present since 2011, both 
in value and the number of deals. The average deal value increased in the last year, caused by the 
increase in megadeals that occurred over the last year. Moreover, cross-board transactions seem 
to have increased with the large players in the industry continuing to expand their overseas 
operations (Moulden & Shanker, 2015).  
The overall factors pushing global transactions discussed in section 2.2.7 seem to partly explain 
the pattern in the industry. However, I believe that consolidation and geographical expansion 
also play a role. Studies indicate that a new trend of M&A strategies has emerged over the past 
years, partly triggered by the challenging effect of rising e-commerce and the digitalization of 
logistics processes. As a consequence, we are observing a rising number of technology driven 
transactions such as tech start-ups and mobile-apps based software solutions. For instance, in 
2014, FedEx acquired Bongo International, a provider of cross-border e-commerce IT solutions, 
UPS acquired i-Parcel to consolidate its strength in the fast-growing global e-commerce market, 
and Deutsche Post DHL acquired StreetScooter, a start-up committed to the development of 
affordable electric vehicles. In 2015, important transactions include the pending $4.8Bn 
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Figure 27: CEP Market share by revenues 
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The degree of rivalry is considered moderate in the CEP industry. There are large international 
players such as UPS, FedEx and DHL that dominate the market offering little differentiation in 
the services provided. 
The bargaining power of supplier seems to be moderate to strong  with a fairly similar situation 
to the one described in the freight forwarding segment regarding the small number of vehicle 
suppliers, difficult access to infrastructures and significant fuel costs.   
The power of buyers can be described as moderate. There are a high number of customers, 
usually with a fixed-term contract, which tends to increase the switching costs, hence, reduce 
their power. Most customers are not sensitive to price but rather to the time of delivery with most 
of them depending on just-in-time inventory to do their businesses. On the other hand, the low 
service differentiation and the possibility to integrate backwards, through the set-up of their own 
in-house logistics, gives them a significant market power.  
The possibility of new firms to enter the market is considered low to moderate. The market is 
already dominated by large, international brands, with a strong reputation in an industry where 
confidence and timing are crucial. Moreover, economies of scale, switching costs and medium 
entry costs seem to protect the incumbent players.  
At last, substitutes to this industry are accessed as moderate. The major alternatives are the in-
house logistics through backward integration. However, these may include more costs rather 
benefits and CEP providers are usually considered a cheaper solution.  
9.4. Annex 4: UPS – SWOT analysis 
UPS has a size and scope effect that most companies operating in this industry do not benefit 
from. In fact, these are the major strengths since they allow the company to cross-sell their 
solutions and offer integrated and complete approaches.  
Its major weaknesses rely on the strong dependence on the U.S. market, being subject to demand 
and general macroeconomic conditions, and on the legal proceedings that occur from the normal 
conduct of businesses in this industry.  
Opportunities come from the positive growth estimates for the sector and the growing demand 
for pick-up locations in the parcel segment, which will reduce the last-mile costs. Consolidation 
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in the industry can work both as an opportunity, if this strategy is pursued by UPS, and as a 
threat, when competitors acquire.  
At last, apart from government regulation, the major threat comes from the crowdsourcing 
services. These crowdsourcing activities, which can come from players such as Uber Cargo and 
CitizenShipper, match shippers with couriers according to travel dates and itineraries. It can 
capture the whole route of the shipment or from UPS’s delivery points to its final destination at 
more convenient hours, e.g. night. These services may be a threat as they decrease the demand 
for UPS shipments of parcels, through lower prices, since these crowdshipping activities do not 
require the heavy-asset infrastructure of warehouses, vehicle fleets, fuel costs and employed 
drivers that traditional logistics companies have. Currently, this trend is only present in the 
consumer segment, and mainly for personal shipments, with many start-up companies emerging 
and expanding. However, some of the players are trying to enter into the business-to-business 
segment, which obviously creates a larger threat.  
 
































Shareholders' distribution by type 
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9.6. Annex 6: Panalpina – SWOT analysis 
Panalpina is one of the top 5 leading companies in the ocean and air freight segments. Adding a 
diversified portfolio of services and a wide geographic presence, which enables cross-selling and 
complete supply chain solutions, these are the company’s major strengths. On the other hand, 
key weaknesses come from legal proceedings, which occur from the industry business, and the 
lack of scale compared to peers such as DHL or Kuehne+Nagel, which can result in reduced 
bargaining power. The main opportunities come from the positive growth estimates for the 
freight sector and the already initiated strategic alliances and partnerships, whose purpose is to 
strengthen and expand its global network. Major threats come from the government regulation 
and the intense consolidation trend. 
9.7. Annex 7: Panalpina – Shareholder Structure 
The largest individual shareholder is a strategic entity, Ernst Göhner Stiftung. This player is a 
foundation, based in Zug, Switzerland, which has both philanthropic and entrepreneurial 
character. The Foundation's assets consist mainly of different corporate investments and large 
real estate holdings with objects mostly in Switzerland.  





















Janus Capital Group Inc
OppenheimerFunds



















Shareholders' distribution by location
Figure 45: Concentration of shareholder ownership, identification and ownership of major shareholder 
Figure 31: Shareholder distribution by type of investor Figure 47: Shareholder distribution by location 
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Messenger Service Stolica; LYNX Express; Unsped Paket Servisi 
Sanayi ve Ticaret 
Polish, U.K. and Turkish-based parcel and express delivery companies, 
respectively, with the purpose to strengthen its domestic networks, 
customer base and capabilities in each of the aforementioned regions. 
Undisclosed consideration; $96.5Mn in cash; Undisclosed 
consideration 
 
Messenger Service Stolica; LYNX Express; Unsped Paket Servisi 
Sanayi ve Ticaret 
Polish, U.K. and Turkish-based parcel and express delivery companies, 
respectively, with the purpose to strengthen its domestic networks, 
customer base and capabilities in each of the aforementioned regions. 



































Pieffe Group; Cemelog; Polar Speed 
Distribution 
Italian, Hungary and U.K. based transportation 
companies specific for the pharmaceutical 
industry. The acquisitions were part of a 
stragey to expand into the healthcare sector. 
Undisclosed considerations 
 
Pieffe Group; Cemelog; Polar Speed 
Distribution 
Italian, Hungary and U.K. based transportation 
companies specific for the pharmaceutical 
industry. The acquisitions were part of a 







Menlo Worldwide Forwarding 
This transaction enabled UPS 
to become a brand in the 
FF&L segment, by expanding 
its global capabilities and add 
guaranteed heavy air freight 
services around the world and 
enabling customers to reach 
the global marketplace faster. 
$260Mn in cash 
 
 
Menlo Worldwide Forwarding 












Corporation; Tra s Courier 
Services 
U.S.  and Romania-based 
transport and freight companies. 
These transactions enabled UPS 
to expand in the freight services 
in these markets. 















Parcel Pro; G4S International 
Logistics 
U.S. and U.K. logistics 
companies. These acquisitions 
are related to high value parcel 




Parcel Pro; G4S International 
Logistics 
U.S. and U.K. logistics 
companies. These acquisitions 











U.S. logistics company. This 
acquisition will bring growth 
opportunities from high growth 
truck freight market expansion, 
customer cross-sale, and 
expansion of its portfolio. 




Figure 32: UPS’s acquisition 
history, only most important 
deals are presentCoyote Logistics 
Figure 33: UPS’s acquisition history, only most important deals are present 
Source: Merger Market, UPS’s website, News, Companies’ press release 
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9.9. Annex 9: Revenue Analysis 
Table 30: Detailed revenue analysis by segment and sub segment, including price and volume when possible, for the historical period 2006-15 and the projected period 2016-20
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9.10. Annex 10: UPS – Revenue Comparison 
 
Segment CAGR 14-1943 
Estimated Market UPS 
U.S. Domestic  4.3% 3.4% 5%-6% 
International   3.0% 3.4% 5%-7% 
Supply Chain and Freight  6.4% 6.5% 5%-7% 
 
Table 31: Comparison of the CAGR 2014-19 of the estimated growth rate with market growth data and UPS’s own estimates per 
segment 
According to the own estimated values, UPS is growing more than the market in the U.S. 
Domestic segment, which is justifiable since it reflects the leadership position of UPS, powered 
by a highly concentrated market, where together with other big players, such as FedEx and DHL, 
crush the smaller companies and obtain higher growth rates. Moreover, the estimated value is 
close to UPS’s own beliefs. 
In the International CEP segment, revenues are estimated to grow slightly less than the market 
and considerably less than the company’s beliefs. Considering the international market mainly 
composed of Europe and Asia, this number is justifiable since UPS is not as strong in these 
regions as it is in the U.S., with local players detaining significant positions. 
In the Supply Chain and Freight, UPS is now growing closer to the market rate mainly due to the 
recent acquisition. Traditionally, UPS has been growing less than the market, since this segment 
has never been the key focus of the company. In addition, the market is highly fragmented with 
several players competing for market shares. The estimated value seems to be in line with both 
market growth and the company’s beliefs. 
9.11. Annex 11: Capital Expenditures & Net Working Capital 
Capital Expenditures 
Capital expenditures have been separated into expenditures in PPE and Intangible assets. The 
estimated values were computed as a percentage of revenues, based on the 2011-15 average, 
attaining 3.4% for PPE and 0.5% for Intangible assets. The exception to this procedure was 2016 
                                                             
43 Market growth data is limited to 2014-19, so the estimated and UPS values were adjusted to enable comparison 
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due to detailed information on purchases commitment mentioned in detail in 2015 AR. This 
estimated value is aligned to UPS’s beliefs of the Capex-Revenue ratio evolution, 4-5%. 
 
Working Capital 
Working capital (WC) consists of the difference between Current Assets and Current Liabilities, 
indicating if the company has enough short term assets to satisfy its short term liabilities. 
However, for valuation purposes, it is only considered the operational working capital, implying 
that cash, short term investments and short term debt are not accounted for. Net working capital 
(NWC) is the difference between the previous and the current WC, expressing if there is a need 
to invest cash to fulfil the current working capital.  
Regarding the estimated values for the Working capital, Accounts Receivable, Accounts 
Payables and Accrued Expenses were estimated as the average percentage of Revenues, COGS, 
and Labor Costs, respectively from the period 2011-15, assuming 11.7%, 21.7% and 7.1%. The 
remaining items of the WC were assumed to remain constant for the estimated period. 
I predict that the Working Capital will vary between 1 to 2% of revenues, leading to increasing 
working capital levels, implying an investment between $115-156Mn per year, with the 
exception of 2016, where no investment will be made, according to the predicted values.  
2 065
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2 800 2 518
















2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Capital Expenditures
Capex PPE Capex Intangbles % Total Revenue
Figure 34: Capital Expenditures, in PPE and Intangible Assets, in USD 
millions, and total capex as a percentage of total revenues of UPS, for the 
historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20 
Table 32: Capital Expenditures, in PPE, Intangible Assets, and 
total, as a percentage of total revenues of UPS, for the historical 




9.12. Annex 12: UPS – Financial Statements 
Income Statement 
 
Table 34: UPS’s Income Statement for the historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20 
Working capital 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Accounts receivable, net 6,502          6,661       7,134       7,092       7,525            8,033                       8,442         8,817           
Deferred Income tax Assets 684              -            -            -            -                 -                            -              -                
Other Current Assets 956              1,274       1,348       1,348       1,348            1,348                       1,348         1,348           
Accounts payables 2,478          2,754       2,587       2,638       2,799            2,988                       3,141         3,280           
Accrued expenses 2,325          2,373       2,253       2,281       2,421            2,584                       2,715         2,836           
Other current liabilities 2,280          2,571       2,838       2,838       2,838            2,838                       2,838         2,838           
Working capital 1,059       237       804       682       815            971                     1,096      1,211        
Net Working Capital 1 -             822       567 -      122       133 -           156 -                    125 -        115 -          
WC as % of Revenues 2% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2%
Table 33: Evolution of Working Capital, its components, and Net Working Capital,  in USD millions and as a percentage of 




Table 35: UPS’s Balance Sheet for the historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20 
79 
 
Cash Fows Statement 
9.13. Annex 13: Dividends, Stock Repurchase and Debt 
Dividends and Stock Repurchase 
Dividends and stock repurchase are a clear priority according to the company’s Annual Report. 
For this reason, looking at the positive net income’s evolution over the estimated period, 
previous dividend growth and payout ratio, it was assumed that total dividends would grow by 
5.7%, which corresponds to the average growth over the 2013-15 period. This dividend growth 
implies a payout ratio between 64%, in 2016, and 60%, in 2020.  
Table 36: UPS’s Statement of cash flows for the historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20 
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Regarding the stock repurchase, the 2016 value derives from the remaining value of a share 
repurchase authorization plan expiring in 2016, while the future repurchase share exhibit a less 
aggressive plan, which is likely to be pursued by UPS according to the latest Annual Report. 
New Debt Analysis 
In order to understand if new debt is needed for the future, one looked at the FCFF that UPS is 
releasing each year and accounted for the cash expended with dividends, share repurchase, share 
issue, debt repayment and interest. 
 
Taking into account the debt necessity achieved in table 37, assumed as long-term debt issues, as 
well as debt repayments, and capital leases44, it was computed total debt presented in the 
following table. In the estimated period, total debt increases until 2019, reaching $15,591Mn, 
and decreases thereafter. 
                                                             
44  Assumed to be the average from 2011-15 
New Debt Analysis 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
FCFF 4,500          3,246       -            4,004       4,397            4,638                   4,888         5,105           
Dividends 2,260 -         2,366 -      2,525 -      2,669 -      2,821 -           2,982 -                  3,152 -        3,332 -          
Share repurchase 3,838 -         2,695 -      2,702 -      1,441 -      1,500 -           1,300 -                  1,200 -        1,000 -          
Share Issue 491              274          249          -            -                 -                        -              -                
Debt Repayment 1,875 -         1,694 -      2,724 -      3,018 -      501 -              864 -                     1,111 -        652 -             
Interest 409 -             366 -         345 -         459 -         473 -              478 -                     478 -           470 -             
New Debt Necessity 3,391 -         3,601 -      8,047 -      3,582 -      898 -              986 -                     1,053 -        349 -             
3 838
2 695 2 702
1 441 1 500 1 300 1 200 1 000

































2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
EPS, DPS, Payout Ratio
Earnings per share Dividend per share Payout Ratio
Table 37: New Debt necessity for the historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20, in USD millions 
Figure 50: Earnings per share, Dividends per share and Payout ratio for the 
historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20, in USD  
Figure 51: Expenses in stock repurchase for the historical 




9.14. Annex 14: Peer Group & Multiples 
Peer Group Description 
 
Table 38: Debt Evolution for the historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20, in USD millions 
Table 39: UPS’s complete peer group description summary 




Peer Group multiples 
In this section I present the multiple analysis with the complete peer group.  As observable, the 
results are significantly lower, with the exception of the P/E. Since these multiples include 
companies that do not operate in all three UPS’s segments, they are not subject to the same 
conditions, hence, the multiples can mislead the true value of the analyzed company. In order to 
solve this problem, it was formed the restricted peer group, which better represents UPS. 
9.15. Annex 15: Panalpina – Revenue Comparison  
With no clear data from the management, a comparison was made between the estimated growth 
rates and the market rates, as can be observed in table 42. There is a significant difference in the 
CAGR 2014-19, however such difference comes from the 2015 values, since revenue fell by 
12.7%, assuming a number significantly lower than the one predicted in the market values. 
Comparing the estimated market growth rates with the CAGR 2015-20, we find closer values 
and predictions that Panalpina will grow above the market in the air and ocean freight and lower 




multiples EV/EBIT EV/ FCFF P/E
FedEx Corporation 21.32 x 80.61 x 15.18 x
Deutsche Post (DHL) 12.40 x 25.26 x 13.15 x
Royal Mail PLC 9.30 x 21.31 x 14.29 x
Post NL 6.02 x 22.24 x 9.03 x
TNT 28.76 x 0.00 x 38.56 x
Transforce Inc 15.19 x 11.20 x 13.03 x
C.H. Robinson 13.30 x 21.47 x 19.53 x
Median 13.30 x 21.86 x 14.29 x
Average 15.18 x 30.35 x 17.54 x
Value weighted 16.77 x 47.32 x 15.68 x
Median 88.93 85.64 67.91
Average 103.36 124.02 83.34
Value weighted 115.50 200.73 74.50
Price per share ($)







9.16. Annex 16: Capital Expenditures & Net Working Capital  
Capital Expenditures 
As in UPS, capital expenditures have been separated into expenditures in PPE and Intangible 
assets. The values were estimated as a percentage of revenues, based on the 2011-15 average, 
attaining 0.42% for PPE and 0.33% for Intangible assets. Even though this value may seem low, 
one should consider that this firm mostly operates under leasing agreements and buys capacity to 
carriers, leading to small values of fixed assets, and implying low capex levels.          
Net Working Capital 
As previously explained, it was not used the common definition of WC but the operational one. 
Hence, Accounts Receivable and Inventory were computed based on the historical 2011-15 
average percentage of Revenues, assuming 15.3% and 1.3%, respectively, Accounts Payables as 
a percentage of COGS, attaining 10.9%, and both Accrued Expenses and Accrued Cost of 
                                                             
45 Market growth data is limited to 2014-20, so the estimated values were adjusted to enable comparison 
Segment CAGR 14-1945 CAGR 15-20 
Estimated Market Estimated 
Air Freight 2.00% 6.27% 7.12% 
Ocean Freight 3.27% 6.26% 6.72% 
Logistics 1.28% 6.80% 5.60% 
Table 42: Comparison of the CAGR 2014-20 of the estimated growth rate with market growth data and UPS’s own estimates per 
segment 
Table 43: Capital Expenditures, PPE, Intangible Assets, 
and total as a percentage of total revenues of Panalpina, for 




















2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Capital Expenditures
Capex PPE Capex intangible assets % Revenues
Figure 35: Capital Expenditures, PPE and Intangible Assets, in CHF 
millions, and total capex as a percentage of total revenues of Panalpina, 
for the historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20 
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Services as the average percentage of total SG&A and Labor Costs, from the aforementioned 
period, assuming 11.4% and 15.1%, respectively. The remaining items of the WC were assumed 
to remain constant for the estimated period.  
With this procedure, I predicted an increasing working capital, stabilizing at 3% of revenues, 
hence leading to an investment in working capital between ₣13-33Mn per year. 
 
Table 44: Evolution of Working Capital and its components, in CHF millions and as a percentage of revenues, and Net Working 
Capital for the historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20 
9.17. Annex 17: Panalpina – Financial Statements  
Income Statement 
  
Working capital 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Accounts receivable, net 1,060      1,013      888          946              1,012        1,083     1,162      1,247    
Unbilled forwarding services - Inventory 91           111         66            82                87             94           100         108       
Other Current Assets 111         104         106          106              106           106         106         106       
Accounts payables 577         534         446          508              544           582         625         670       
Accrued expenses 152         158         150          151              161           172         182         195       
Accrued cost of services 184         206         223          200              213           227         242         258       
Other current liabilities 157         128         94            94                94             94           94            94         
Working capital 191      203       147       180          194        208      227       245     
Inv in working capital 37 -       12 -        55         33 -           13 -         15 -       18 -        18 -      
WC as % of Revenues 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%




Table 46: Panalpina’s Balance Sheet for the historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20 
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Cash flows Statement 
 
  
Table 47: Panalpina’s Statement of cash flows for the historical period 2013-15 and the projected period 2016-20 
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9.18. Annex 18: Method A  
 
Under method A, the cost of capital is computed with domestic terms, assuming a value of 
6.83%, detailed under table 48:  
Component Value Description Source 
Cost of Debt 1.14%  RBC Capital Markets 
Tax Rate 25% Average Effective tax rate 2014-15 Panalpina’s financials 
MV of Net Debt -₣392Mn  MV Debt - Cash and Cash Equivalents Panalpina’s financials 
Cost of Equity 6.83% Risk Free -0.41% 10 year Swiss Gov Bond Swiss Exchange 
Market Risk 6.55% Historical Average SMI Damodaran 
MRP 6.96% Market Risk - Risk Free  
Levered Beta 1.04 5yr regression, monthly data Reuters 
MV of Equity ₣2,500Mn Market Capitalization Reuters 
Table 48: WACC components 
With this discount rate and a spot rate of the day prior to the valuation, I achieved an Enterprise 
Value of $2,141Mn, and Equity Value of $2,530Mn and a price per share of $106.63. Hence the 
valuation output is extremely close to method B. 
In millions except per share data 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Discounted Cash flow 45               69               73               80               1,821          
Entreprise Value 2,088       
Non controling interest 12            
Net debt 392 -         
Equity value 2,468       
Outstanding shares 24            
Equity value per share (CHF) 103.98     
Spot rate 1.0255
Equity value per share (USD) 106.63     





Peer Group multiples 
In this section I present the multiple analysis with the complete peer group.  As observable, the 
results are close to restricted group, with the exception of EV/FCFF, which is significantly 
lower.  
 
9.20. Annex 20: Selected Deals in the Industry 
              Premium   
Announced 
Date Target Bidder 
Deal Value  
(USD Mn) 
EV /        
EBITDA 
EV /       
EBIT 

















Network  88 n.a. n.a. n.a. Private company n.a. 
09/10/2015 UTi Worldwide  DSV 1,350 -43.59x n.a. 0.32x 50% 34% $75Mn 
09/09/2015 Con-way 
XPO 

















Logistics 100 8.06x n.a. 0.43x Private company n.a. 
Forward multiples EV/EBIT EV/ FCFF P/E
Kuehne+Nagel 16.52 x 21.08 x 24.70 x
Deutsche Post (DHL) 12.40 x 25.26 x 13.15 x
Kerry Logistics Network Ltd 10.80 x n.a. 15.36 x
TNT 28.76 x n.a. 38.56 x
AP Moeller Maersk 28.76 x 71.96 x 18.34 x
DSV 20.76 x 148.20 x 24.67 x
Expeditors International 11.20 x 16.33 x 25.50 x
Median 16.52 x 25.26 x 24.67 x
Average 18.46 x 56.56 x 22.90 x
Value weighted 19.27 x 45.62 x 19.14 x
Median 97.30 69.38 93.46
Average 106.77 135.02 86.73
Value weighted 110.74 112.07 72.51
Price per share ($)







Logistics 3,520 10.13x 20.90x 0.63x 34% 38.01% n.a. 





Logistics 59 7.20x n.a. 0.52x Private company n.a. 
20/01/2015 Wheels Group 
Radiant 


























Logistics 37 5.89x n.a. 0.58x Private company n.a. 








on Systems 13 n.a. n.a. 0.62x Private company n.a. 
18/07/2014 F.S. Mackenzie  
Singapore 
Post  8 8.14x 8.03x 0.16x Private company n.a. 
02/06/2014 
Transport 






















Logistics 278 12.04x 19.19x 0.28x 8.04% 9.62% n.a. 
          
  
Median  168 7.63x 11.57x 0.57x 32% 34% 
 
  
Average  851 5.68x 13.32x 0.58x 26% 27% 
  
Table 53: Selected M&A deals that occurred in the industry from January 2014 to March 2016, including target, bidder, deal 
value, transaction multiples and premiums paid 










DSV A/S, listed Denmark-based company, is a supplier of transport and logistics services. 
UTi Worldwide Inc., listed U.S. based group, is an integrated logistics company providing support chain logistics services and 
planning and optimization solutions. 
Rationale: The two companies are operating in an industry where increasingly scale is critical. Hence, joining forces with DSV 
delivers substantially greater client value and future opportunities for UTi Worldwide, while it is financially attractive for its 
shareholders. 




XPO Logistics, Inc., listed U.S. based company, is a logistics provider of freight brokerage transportation services. 
Con-way Inc., U.S. based company, is engaged in providing transportation and supply chain management services for a range of 
manufacturing, industrial, and retail customers. 
Rationale: The acquisition will enable XPO Logistics to become the second largest provider of less-than-truckload transportation 
in North America, while enabling the company to expand its global contract logistics platform and strengthening its position in the 
e-commerce sector. On the other hand, the acquisition will enable Con-way to provide better services to its customers and create 








United Parcel Service, Inc. has agreed to acquire Coyote Logistics, LLC, U.S. based company engaged in providing third-party 
logistics services, for a consideration of $1800 Mn. 
The acquisition will be funded with available cash resources and through existing and new debt arrangements.                                                                                                                    
Rationale: This acquisition will provide UPS with growth opportunities from high growth truck freight market expansion, Coyote 
organic growth, customer cross-selling, and expand its portfolio. The transaction combines UPS and its 100,000 package vans and 
other vehicles with Coyote's experience linking customers to a chain of 35,000 trucking companies.  
Post acquisition, Coyote will operate as a subsidiary of UPS under the leadership of Jeff Silver, the CEO of Coyote.  





Kuehne + Nagel International AG, listed Switzerland-based provider of transport, logistics and supply chain management 
solutions, has agreed to acquire ReTrans, Inc, U.S. based company that provides transportation and logistics management services 
for transporting goods, 
Rationale: The transaction is line with Kuehne + Nagel’s strategy to grow organically and through acquisition complementing the 








XPO Logistics, described above, launched a mandatory public offer for Norbert Dentressangle SA, a France based and listed 
family-owned transportation and logistics company. 
Rationale: XPO intends to use the acquired operations of Norbert as a platform to grow its business in Europe. The acquisition 
will give substantial company-wide cross-selling opportunities. The combined entity will benefit from global scale in contract 
logistics operations. 




Wheels Group Inc. (WG), the listed Canada-based company is engaged in operating as a provider of third-party logistics and 
supply chain logistics services. 
Radiant Logistics, Inc. (RL), the U.S. based company is engaged in providing logistics, transportation and supply chain 
management services. 
Rationale: The acquisition will help to accelerate its growth plans. The transaction is a combination of two companies which share 
the same vision and provide complimentary services, this will help them to expand operational capabilities and geographic reach. 
Table 54: Detailed Description of Selected M&A deals that occurred in the industry from January 2014 to March 2016 
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